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ABSTRACT 
Democratic citizen orientation – support for democratic principles and values – 
appears an important ingredient in making democracies work. However, there is no 
agreement as to what attitudes and behaviors make up a democratic citizen orientation. 
The main goals of this dissertation are to: (1) identify and describe factors that 
characterize adolescents’ democratic orientation, (2) explore cross-cultural variation in 
democratic orientations among adolescents in established and aspiring democracies, (3) 
investigate the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientations and historical 
legacies of their countries, (4) investigate the relationship between adolescents’ 
democratic orientations and the current quality of democratic institutions, and (5) analyze 
the implications of democratic orientations among adolescents for their expected 
involvement in future political and social activities.  
This dissertation addresses these goals through quantitative analyses of data from 
the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS, 2009) and the Quality of 
Democracy Index (2008-2009). Results from this dissertation reveal that democratic 
orientation does not form a homogenous democratic mindset. Rather, a pro-democratic 
orientation contains a multidimensional pattern of democratic attitudes, with three 
distinct aspects consistently present in all analyzed societies. Analyses of the role of 
historic legacies show that in their democratic orientations, adolescents are still largely 
influenced by previous regimes of their respective societies. Thus, it was found that 
countries with a history of democratic traditions tend to have a higher proportion of 
democratically-oriented adolescents in comparison with countries with a history of 
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communism. However, the results are mixed in terms of specific factors that compose 
adolescents’ democratic orientation. On average, students in countries with a history of 
democratic tradition show a greater endorsement of civil liberties values than students 
from countries with a history of communism. Similarly, higher trust levels are observed 
among adolescents in established democracies than among their peers in aspiring 
democracies. At the same time, when compared with adolescents in established 
democracies, students from aspiring democracies are more likely to have higher scores on 
the measure of engagement potential.  
Additional results show a strong relationship between adolescents’ democratic 
orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries. Specifically, a 
positive relationship was established between the quality of democratic institutions and 
adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties values and trust levels. Alternatively, a 
negative association was documented between adolescents’ engagement potential and the 
quality of democratic institutions. Comparisons of the relative contributions of historical 
legacy and the quality of democratic orientations produced mixed results. Although 
historical legacy was found to be more important in determining the trust aspect of 
adolescents’ democratic orientations, two other aspects, civil liberties and engagement 
potential, were found to be influenced more by the quality of current democratic 
institutions than by historical legacy. Finally, specific aspects of a democratic orientation 
appear important factors in explaining variation in adolescents’ expectations for future 
participation in social and political activities.  
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Overall, this descriptive, comparative, and analytical study affirms the importance 
of adolescents’ pro-democratic orientation for democratic prospects of individual 
countries and whole regions. In addition, results support earlier claims that at the level of 
public beliefs and orientations, democracy has taken root in most transitioning societies. 
A better understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientations should help inform 
policies that seek to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Importance of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations 
The democratic outlook of young people in today’s societies is critical for 
understanding and predicting developments in the political sphere as well as for 
analyzing a broad array of issues in the larger social and cultural domains (Forbig, 2005; 
Garbarino, 2011; Inglehart, 2003; Print, 2007; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & 
Schulz, 2001; Torney-Purta, Amadeo, & Pilotti, 2004). In the context of aspiring 
democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, the question of democratic orientations 
among adolescents gains additional importance as a new generation of post-communism 
citizens is coming of age in societies that continue to tackle persisting challenges of the 
transition period (Dimitrova-Grazl & Simon, 2010; Havel, 2007; Nikolayenko, 2008, 
2011a, b). Many scholars, policymakers and other experts have expressed concerns with 
regard to future democratization and consolidation of democratic institutions in 
transitioning states and have pointed to the critical role young people play in these 
processes. In a similar vein, scholars of democratic processes in advanced democracies 
have long warned that negative trends in civic attitudes and behavior patterns among 
youth have potentially negative implications for democracy (Dalton, 2004; Flanagan, 
Levine, & Settersten, 2009; Settersten & Ray, 2010; Smith et al., 2011).  
The survival, consolidation, and advancement of democracy in all states requires 
the support of democratically oriented citizens, including younger generations. Learning 
more about democratic attitudes among adolescents across different cultures has 
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important implications for the fields of political science, developmental psychology, and 
other disciplines (Hooghe, 2004). If we can find out more about political orientations of 
young people, it would give us better insight into the future. As Franklin (2004) noted, 
“The future lies in the hands of young people … because they are the ones who react to 
new conditions” (p. 216).  
Learning more about democratic orientation among adolescents is valuable not 
only because it allows one to assess the level of readiness for democratic advancement in 
the societies of interest, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because it provides 
valuable insights into the worldview that shapes adolescents’ orientations towards others 
within their communities and the larger society (Nikolayenko, 2008, 2011(a), 2011(c)). 
Gaining a greater insight into adolescents’ democratic orientation, operationalized in this 
research as a set of attitudes and behavioral patterns conducive to democracy, can help 
one understand whether adolescents perceive themselves as full members of their 
communities and whether they feel a sense of obligation to their communities and society 
as a whole.  
In addition, focusing on adolescents’ democratic orientation as a value in and of 
itself is important from a children’s right perspective and is consistent with international 
scholarship and advocacy that seek to advance the status of children (Alparone & 
Rissotto, 2001; Freeman, 2007; Melton, 2005). A landmark phenomenon with regard to 
policy and research on children’s issues has been the adoption of the 1989 United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) that established a comprehensive 
framework for treating and protecting children. One of the most significant achievements 
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of the Convention is that children have begun to be viewed as active participants of their 
life situations, as opposed to mere recipients of adults’ protective efforts (Amna, Munk, 
& Zetterberg, 2004; Benson, 2003; Hart & Mojica, 2006; Melton, 2006; Smith, 2009). In 
a similar vein, a new emphasis on viewing children as resources to be developed rather 
than problems to be solved has emerged (Roth & Brooks-Gunn, 2003). In light of 
changes encouraged by interpretation and implementation of CRC principles, many 
researchers have adopted a more complex, interactive approach that considers 
adolescents as individuals with agency capable of independent thought and action 
(Benson, 2003; Lerner, 2005; Sapiro, 2004). For example, Checkoway and colleagues 
(2003) argued that adolescents are “competent citizens” who have the capacity and skills 
to participate in matters relevant to their lives within the context of their communities. 
Thus, taking into consideration the creation of new legal codes and the shift in 
international norms for viewing children, the perspective of young people with regard to 
democracy has important policy implications for implementing provisions of the CRC.  
Finally, in the context of transitioning societies, learning about democratic 
attitudes is instructive for adolescents and societies themselves. As Rose (2009) noted, 
“For people living in a society that has been transformed, learning about change is more 
than academic; it is a necessity” (p. 212). In discussing different aspects of democratic 
transformation, an important role is given to children and young adults (Tomasik & 
Silbereisen, 2012). On the one hand, some view underage population as being especially 
vulnerable to the effects of transition (Lay & Torney-Purta, 2002; McAuley & 
Macdonald, 2007). On the other hand, others believe that children and youth have a 
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higher likelihood of benefiting from the transition than older generations (Agranovitch et 
al., 2005; Finkel & Smith, 2011; Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2012). Although there are some 
disagreements about the effects of transition on children, there is a growing recognition 
that younger generations have the potential to contribute to the promotion of new 
democratic values and norms and help bring their communities closer to the democratic 
West (Blum, 2006; Brady, 2007; Cockburn, 2005; Demes & Forbig, 2007; Hart, 1997; 
Levitskaya, n.d.).  
Consequently, knowing more about adolescents’ democratic orientation might 
inform policies and programs aimed at democracy promotion. Many policymakers 
emphasize the importance of ordinary citizens in democracy promotion and have 
advocated for a greater inclusion of youth in such efforts (Carothers, 2002; Marples, 
2009). Some have argued that understanding and popularization of the concept of 
democratic political culture among the general population is a key component in shaping 
a prospective democratic outlook of transitioning countries (Stewart, 2009a, 2009b). 
However, to help young people realize their potential to contribute to democratic survival 
and advancement, it is first necessary to identify their democratic preferences.  
Of note, children and youth of today’s transitioning states are among the first 
generations who grew up with no direct experience of living under a totalitarian system 
(Agranovitch et al., 2005; Nikolayenko, 2011a, 2011b). Because these new generations, 
in the words of Vaclav Havel “are only now emerging into adulthood,” it is unclear to 
what extent youths’ attitudes are shaped by new processes taking place in their 
contemporary societies and to what degree deeper socio-cultural norms influence their 
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democratic preferences and beliefs (Havel, 2007, p. 7). Thus, some have argued that 
young people tend to embrace cultural and societal changes more easily than older 
generations (Nikolayenko, 2008). At the same time, it is widely accepted that cultural 
values and norms, rooted in history and traditions of all societies, are “slow-moving 
institutions.” T, for example, adolescents might still be influenced by Soviet images that 
are part of collective memory in post-communist societies (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 
2010, p. 209).    
In sum, examining the nature of young people’s democratic orientation might help 
(a) describe the diverse range of democratic attitudes and behavioral patterns displayed 
by adolescents in different countries, (b) examine links between countries’ democratic 
record and adolescents’ democratic orientations, (c) reframe the research on 
democratization in terms of inclusion of youth, and (d) identify future directions in the 
development of societies in transition. In addition, analyses of the relationships between 
countries’ historical legacies, current functioning of democratic institutions and young 
people’s democratic orientations may help better describe the factors that influence 
young people’s decisions to endorse democratic values and principles. This is why 
investigating the specifics of youth attitudes towards democratic principles across 
cultures is crucial both in terms of theoretical inquiries and practical implementation. 
Hence, topics related to adolescents’ democratic orientation are worth researching. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Democratic Citizen Orientation 
Many scholars of democracy, democratic transitions, and consolidation focus on 
institutions and structures within society that are essential to democratic survival and 
development (for example, Dahl, 1971, 1998; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003; Diamond, 
1997, 1999, 2011; Inglehart, 2000, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003). Generally, studies 
that deal with elements of democratic society fall under one of the two broad categories. 
One stems from a minimalist definition of democracy as a system of “government of the 
people, by the people, for the people” and deals with formal institutions and mechanisms 
through which democracy operates. Studies that fall under this category emphasize free 
and fair elections, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and other structures 
within social and political domains that, when taken together, create an environment 
favorable for democratic functioning (e.g., Huntington, 1991).  
The other broad group of democratization studies singles out norms and behavior 
patterns among ordinary citizens as key elements conducive to democratic advancement 
(Almond & Verba, 1963; Huntington, 1993; Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; 
Lipset, 1994; Nikolayenko, 2011a, 2011c; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Supporters of this 
position argue for a more expansive definition of democratic society that goes beyond its 
basic elements and structures. Specifically, attitudes of the general public toward formal 
structures of democracy along with individuals’ beliefs and behaviors are considered an 
inseparable component of democratic society. Both classic and modern scholars of 
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democracy emphasize the importance of public support for and endorsement of 
democratic values. For example, De Tocqueville (1838 [2000]) considered democratic 
values the foundation of civil society, and voluntary associations, the key to flourishing 
democratic institutions. Nearly two centuries later Diamond (2008) wrote, “As a system 
of government that requires the consent of the governed, democracy stands or falls with 
citizen commitment to its norms and structures” (Introduction, p. x).  
The importance of citizens’ values and beliefs for a country’s democratic 
advancement was first empirically established by Almond and Verba (1963). They found 
a strong link between democratization and attitudes and behaviors displayed by the 
general public. Specifically, they claimed that, “… the development of a stable and 
effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government 
and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process – 
upon the political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 498). Easton (1965) further 
analyzed how citizens’ adherence to democratic principles affect country’s democratic 
functioning. In his seminal work on the role of citizens’ attitudes for democracy, he 
established that public appreciation of democracy as a value in itself appears the main 
condition that ensures democratic continuity across different periods of economic, 
political or social hardships. In a similar vein, Patrick (1996) claimed that constitutional 
democracy cannot be a “machine that would go off itself” (p. 4). Rather, he argued, 
democracy can function properly only when there is a certain level of public 
understanding about ideas of democracy and a widespread commitment to its ideals and 
principles.  
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Since then, a burgeoning body of literature has documented a number of 
supportive habits and attitudes of the general population that are essential for survival and 
development of democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980; Eckstein, 1998; Inglehart, 
2000; Mattes, 2010; Norris, 1999; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Almond and Verba’s (1963) 
work on the concept of civic culture laid the foundation for future inquiries into what 
democracy researchers frequently refer to as democratic culture orientation and what in 
this research is referred to as democratic citizen orientation. Almond was among the first 
scholars to offer a systematic overview of individuals’ qualities and values that facilitate 
democratic development. In his combination of components that matter for democracy, 
he emphasized such elements as “informed, analytic, and rational” involvement of 
citizens and their active role in the political and social life of society (p. 160).     
Another prominent work on the role of citizens’ orientation for democratic 
development is a study by Inglehart (1988). Inglehart introduced the notion of a 
democratic political culture, defined broadly as a set of norms and behaviors that are 
conducive to democratic development. Specifically, he singled out two components that 
appeared important for sustainability and development of democratic institutions (a) 
interpersonal trust and (b) long-term commitment to democratic institutions. According 
to Inglehart, interpersonal trust appears a “prerequisite to the formation of secondary 
associations,” and is essential for “the functioning of the democratic rules of the game” 
(p. 1204). In his later research with Christian Welzel, he expanded these categories to 
include the following attitudes and qualities of democratically-oriented public: tolerance 
toward minority groups, interpersonal trust, a sense of well-being, political participation, 
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and emphasis on postmaterialist values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2003; 2006). In his 
subsequent works, Inglehart argued that the course of democratic survival and 
development is determined by the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens. Additionally, he 
emphasized the importance of democratically oriented citizenry for a country’s long-term 
development by claiming that “political culture is a better predictor of the long-term 
stability of democracy than it is of a society’s level of democracy at any given point in 
time” (Inglehart, 2003, p. 53).  
Tessler and Gao (2009) further explored the concept of a pro-democratic political 
culture and the role of citizens’ values and behaviors in facilitating such a culture. 
Specifically, they investigated how citizens in non-Western societies with different 
histories and varying democratic institutions view elements of democratic political 
culture. In examining the concept of democratic political culture, they focused on six 
specific components: support for gender equality, tolerance, interpersonal trust, civic 
participation, political interest, and political knowledge. Results revealed that although 
distinct, these elements appeared interrelated and helped promote a democratic political 
culture orientation among ordinary citizens. In concluding their research, Tessler and Gao 
(2009) confirmed earlier findings about the significance of citizens’ democratic 
orientations by noting that successful democratization depends not only on commitment 
of government authorities to carry out democratic reforms but also on “the normative and 
behavioral predispositions of ordinary citizens” (p. 197). Of note, Tessler and Gao’s 
(2009) findings suggest that the relationship between democratic norms and the status of 
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democracy exists not only in established democracies but that it can also be observed 
among states that are moving toward democratic consolidation.  
Dalton and Shin (2003) also studied democratic aspirations and endorsement of 
democratic ideals by ordinary citizens as essential ingredients of a democratic society. 
Specifically, they focused on public support for a democratic form of government and 
beliefs that democracy is the most effective form of government. In their article 
reviewing research on democratization and summarizing their work on political 
implications of public support for democracy, Dalton and Shin concluded that:   
The course of democratization, at least over the short term, is more likely to 
depend on the strategic decisions of national elites than on the responses of 
citizens to a public opinion survey. But in the long run, a democratic system 
requires a democratic public to survive and function.  (p. 20). 
Other researchers have documented the connection between specific components 
of a democratically-oriented citizenry and various aspects of sociopolitical reality. For 
example, Gibson (1998) linked tolerance of outgroups with flourishing democracy and 
argued that the former is an essential ingredient in any democratic society. Inglehart 
(1999) believed that trust serves as a foundation for democracy and claimed that for a 
democratic society to function, interpersonal trust among members of society is critical. 
Similarly, Uslaner (2006) argued that trust is the key to better government, greater 
economic growth, and more tolerance among members of the society. According to him, 
more trusting societies have less corruption than societies with lower levels of trust. In 
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turn, Fukuyama (1995, 2000) claimed that the level of trust among the members of 
society was a strong predictor of economic success.    
Furthermore, according to some political culture theorists, support for democracy 
appears an important dimension in the quality of democratic institutions (Diamond & 
Morlino 2005; O'Donnell, Cullell, & Iazzetta, 2004). Thus some have argued that 
attitudes of the public may appear better indicators of a country’s success on a number of 
social, political, and economic phenomena than traditional measures of a country’s 
development, such as changes in the gross domestic product (GDP) (Inglehart & Welzel, 
2003).  
More generally, a number of self-expression values, such as subjective well-
being, liberty aspirations, interpersonal trust, and others were found to be related to the 
extent to which a society has developed an effective democratic infrastructure (Inglehart 
& Welzel, 2006). Upon examining over 80 societies at various stages of democratic 
advancement, Inglehart and Welzel (2006) concluded that “mass attitudes have a 
powerful impact on the emergence and survival of democratic institutions” (p. 17). In 
more detail, they used data from the World Values Survey and Freedom House ratings to 
evaluate their arguments and found that such attitudes as interpersonal trust, post-
materialist values, tolerance for outgroups, and others were directly related to societal-
level democracy. They further suggested that support for democracy is instrumental for 
spreading democracy across the world. In his conceptual essay on the future of 
democracy, Diamond (2001) also explored the role of democratic orientations among 
citizens and concluded that, “One crucial dimension of consolidation involves norms and 
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beliefs about the legitimacy of democracy, both in principle and as it is embodied in a 
particular regime (p. 1).  
In sum, much attention has been dedicated to researching formal and informal 
structures and institutions within society as key factors that facilitate processes of 
democratic transformation and consolidation. Of many elements that strengthen 
democracy, pro-democratic attitudes and beliefs of ordinary citizens appear to play a 
major role. In particular, public beliefs and attitudes toward democracy have been found 
to be crucial to the processes of democratic legitimation and consolidation (Mattes, 2010; 
Patrick, 1996).  
Democratic Citizen Orientation and Adolescence 
Because citizens do not suddenly develop democratic orientation when they reach 
18 (an internationally recognized age of adulthood), pre-adult years have been identified 
as an important period in the formation of democracy related attitudes (Flanagan & 
Sherrod, 1998; Vygotsky, 1978). In particular, developmental psychologists have long 
singled out adolescence
1
 as a critical stage in human development that is particularly 
suitable for studying the formation and development of a variety of values and beliefs, 
including sociopolitical attitudes. The theory of Erikson (1968), for example, identified 
adolescence as a stage in human development typically defined by such processes as 
identity formation and self-definition.  
In general, it has been established that attitudes related to social and political 
spheres are developed at a relatively young age and not only remain stable in later years, 
                                                          
1
 The word “adolescence” is of Latin origin, stemming from the verb “adolescere,” which means “to grow 
up,” as stated in Oxford English Dictionary.  
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but even “harden” with time (for example, Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002; Sears & Levy, 
2003; Uslaner, 2002). According to Bandura (1986), because of the cumulative and 
continuous nature of human experiences, individuals’ attitudes and behaviors cannot be 
too dissimilar at different periods throughout a lifetime. Additionally, adolescents and 
young adults’ skills and capabilities have been identified as approaching those of adults 
(Erickson, 1968; Kohlberg, 1969). In emphasizing adolescents’ potential, some have 
pointed to rapid cognitive and emotional development and increase in the overall 
maturity as main characteristics of the period of adolescence (Berman, 1997; Yates & 
Youniss, 1999).    
Not only developmental research emphasizes the significance of adolescence for a 
person’s development. Researchers from other disciplines have focused on adolescence 
as a period that has important implications for attitudinal and behavioral preferences of 
future adult generations. For example, a number of political science theorists documented 
persistence of adolescents’ attitudes into adult years (Jennings, 2002; Jennings & Niemi, 
1973, 1981). The basic premise underlying political socialization studies is that attitudes 
and behaviors related to political and social spheres develop in young people and persist 
through adulthood (Sears, 1990). In 1994, Conover and Searing described civic behavior 
as “a lifelong habit that begins in childhood” (p. 33). 
Empirical research has found some evidence in these theoretical claims. For 
example, political trust, a core component of a democratic citizen orientation, has been 
documented to be well established by age 14 (Hooghe, 2004). According to Newton and 
Morris (2000), trust is as a personality trait that is formed in the early stages of 
14 
 
psychological development of individuals and persists throughout life. Uslaner (2002) 
further suggested that different types of trust are developed at a relatively young age and 
remain stable in later years. Easton and Dennis (1967) found that by the third grade 
children have developed a sense of political efficacy, another essential component in the 
mind of a democratically oriented citizen. In addition, they considered children and 
young adults important agents in political interaction processes who learn basic 
democratic norms and values early in life.  
Other researchers analyzed the stability of political attitudes between younger and 
older populations and found that the level of trust in governmental institutions was 
sustained throughout different developmental periods in person’s life (Hooghe, 2004; 
Hooghe & Wilkenfeld, 2008). For example, Hooghe and Wilkenfeld (2008) studied 
political attitudes and behaviors among adolescents and young adults from eight different 
countries to determine whether substantial shifts in these attitudes occurred over time. 
The study found that patterns of political trust were well established by age 14 among 
adolescents from all participating states and remained similar throughout different points 
in time. The analysis showed that one particular aspect of trust - generalized trust - was 
among the most stable attitudes and remained virtually unchanged during adolescence 
and early adulthood. Specifically, it was found that participants from three age cohorts – 
adolescents (14 year olds), late adolescents (18 year olds), and young adults (18 to 30 
year olds) followed a relatively stable pattern with regard to their trust attitudes.  
Furthermore, others have documented children’s understanding of basic concepts 
pertaining to social and political spheres (Limber, Kask, Heidmets, Kaufman, & Melton, 
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1999; Melton & Limber, 1992). As highlighted by Melton and Limber (1992), children as 
young as of elementary school age have basic understanding of rights and 
responsibilities, including the right to have a say in matters relevant to their everyday 
activities. Torney-Purta and colleagues (2004) also pointed out to the importance of 
studying democratic attitudes among adolescents. In particular, they noted that “cognitive 
understanding of political issues bears a complex relationship throughout life” and that 
adolescence represents an important period to study it (p. 383). In their cross-country 
analysis of adolescents’ political engagement, this group of researchers concluded that a 
certain level of trust contributes to young people’s development of political identity, 
sense of civic responsibility, and political self-efficacy. Moreover, they concluded that 
trust in political institutions might provide a foundation for adolescents’ further 
involvement with political activities. Upon examining children and adolescents’ patterns 
of behavior in multiple contexts, Larson and Verma (2001) concluded, that “young 
children and especially adolescents should be considered as resources, active agents of 
change, and as a group that should be viewed in terms of their enormous potential for 
having a positive influence on a society” (p. 125). 
In the context of societies in transformation, studying adolescents gains additional 
importance from the point of view of democratic consolidation (Dimitrova-Grajzl & 
Simon, 2010; Finkel & Smith, 2011, Nikolayenko, 2011). In the words of Dimitrova-
Grajzl and Simon (2010), “Studying young people is important in the context of 
establishing democracy and the survival of democracy” (p. 206). Of note, adolescents 
coming of age at the end of the 20
th
 century in post-communist societies of Central and 
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Eastern Europe are often referred to as a “unique historical generation” (Macek et al., 
1998, p. 548). Growing up in post-communist societies, adolescents not only experienced 
a world different from that of their counterparts in democratic societies, but also a world 
that had little in common with experiences of their parents, older peers and even younger 
generations in the same societies. For many of them, adolescence was defined not only by 
personal transformations but also by larger transformation processes happening in their 
societies. As Macek and colleagues (1998) noted, “they [adolescents] were trying to form 
their own identity during a time when a society as a whole was searching for a new 
identity” (p. 549).  
Adolescents’ democratic orientations are instructive not only with regard to 
implications for future developments in political and social domains, but they also could 
shed some light on the current situation in these domains. For example, Garbarino (2011) 
described children and youths as a “social weather vane,” meaning that they “mirror and 
internalize what is going on in their society, particularly with respect to issues of 
authority and norms of civic participation” (p. 444). Not surprisingly, political attitudes 
of younger generations are often granted much attention in identifying or forecasting 
social or political changes.  
Despite a nearly universal consensus that studies of adolescents hold a significant 
relevance for the fields of psychology, political science, and other disciplines, this 
population appears to be understudied in democratization studies in comparison with 
adults (Hooghe, 2004). A great deal of scientific evidence on democratic orientations, 
including the majority of the above-noted findings, has relied on surveys and various 
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research experiments conducted among adults. Similarly, there is abundant research on 
social, psychological, and other effects of transition on adult population. However, few 
researchers have investigated how children and adolescents have coped with 
democratization. Moreover, virtually nothing is known about the nature and 
characteristics of the adjustment to emerging democratic regimes among adolescents and 
young adults with no direct experience of a communist rule (Nikolayenko, 2011).  
Although research on adolescents’ perceptions of democratic attributes is limited, 
some important insights can be gleaned from it. Thus, a study comparing adolescents and 
adults’ conceptions of democracy revealed that adolescents tend to conceptualize 
democracy from a more self-centered perspective than adults (Menezes & Campos, 
1997). In particular, it was established that adolescents associated the meaning of 
freedom with issues of personal autonomy while the same meaning in both young adults 
and adults had a more universalistic meaning. Clearly, more research is needed to look 
into other aspects of democratic attitudes.     
Apart from the fact that expanding research on democratic orientations to include 
adolescents could fill in some blanks in the literature on democratization, there are other 
sound reasons to investigate adolescents’ democratic orientations based on policy 
implications of such studies. Specifically, generational differences in regard to political 
attitudes have been well-recognized and appear important indicators of future 
developments within a political domain of society (Hooghe, 2004). As Franklin (2004) 
noted, “The future lies in the hands of young people … because they are the ones who 
react to new conditions” (p. 216). Illustrative in this regard are cross-cultural comparisons 
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of political engagement among adolescents as expressed in voter turnout have shown that 
this type of political activity is especially in decline among younger generations 
(Franklin, 2004; Plutzer, 2002).  
In sum, adolescents’ attitudes are of special interest in the discourse of democratic 
orientations for a number of reasons. First, it has been found that political attitudes are 
formed during the period of adolescence and remain relatively stable throughout a 
person’s life course life (Sagy, Adwan, & Kaplan, 2002). This finding has important 
implications for policies aimed at fostering democratic values among the general 
populations. Secondly, adolescents’ attitudes are valuable from the perspective of their 
reflection of broader social norms and societal values. This is especially important in 
terms of assessing the status of democratic developments in a specific society and 
exploring the relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ 
democratic preferences. Finally, researching youths’ preferences and their views upon 
certain aspects of socio-political reality have important implications for discerning future 
social and political orientations of adult population and, therefore, provide better insights 
into future democratic developments within a specific country. Identifying potential gaps 
as well as assents in adolescents’ democratic orientations might help design better 
policies aimed at fostering the culture of democracy. Barber (1992) argued that 
democratically oriented citizens are not born but made. In his later statement he added 
that, “We may be natural consumers and born narcissists but citizens have to be made” 
(Barber, 1993, p. 43).  
 
19 
 
Measuring Democratic Citizen Orientation 
Despite a unanimous agreement on the importance of democratic citizen 
orientation for democratic functioning, no consensus has been reached in terms of 
measuring citizens’ appreciation of democracy and their attitudes towards core 
components of a democratic society (Alvarez & Welzel, n.d.; Dalton, Shin, & Jou, 2007; 
Shin 2007; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). As Kaase (cited in Dalton, 2000) noted in this 
regard almost three decades ago, “Measuring political culture is like “trying to nail jello 
to the wall” (p. 914). In part, a lack of agreement on how to assess democratic political 
culture or people’s democratic orientations is rooted in ongoing scholarly and policy 
debates on how to measure democracy per se (Bollen, 1990; Diamond, 1997; Schedler & 
Sarsfield, 2004).  
Generally, a starting point in evaluating the state of democracy in a particular 
society is to compare the elements of an ideal form of democracy to the features of the 
society at focus. Thus, little or no disagreement exists in outlining a set of structural 
elements that constitute an ideal democracy. However, questions related to the degree to 
which these elements are present in a certain society and, consequently, the degree to 
which that society can be called democratic are likely to produce varying responses from 
different scholars, governmental authorities, or policy makers. For example, despite the 
presence of democratic institutions in most post-communist societies, Rose (2009) argued 
that “because of the weakness of the rule of law, no post-Soviet regime can be described 
as a democracy” (p. 14). Others have pointed out to the importance of distinguishing 
between liberal democracy and other types of democracy, such as multicultural, 
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consociational, or ethnic democracies (Smooha, 2002; Van Den Berghe, 2002; Zakaria, 
1997). Overall, despite a universal consensus on what constitutes ideal democracy, 
research on concepts of actual democracy is not uniquely defined (Dahl, 1971, 1998; 
Welzel & Inglehart, 2008). The nature and functioning of democratic institutions in 
society continues to be a subject of many debates that have to do with democracy 
promotion, democratic transition and consolidation, and other issues.  
In attempts to address these concerns, some have adopted the notion of 
democracy as a continuous variable. According to this view, democracy is present in 
most countries to varying degrees (Bollen, 1990). As a result, continuous measures of 
democracy have been introduced and continue to be widely used by a number of agencies 
and individual researchers. In his article on democracy rankings, Campbell (2008) 
reviewed four major initiatives that measure democracies in a global context. 
Specifically, he analyzed methodological approaches and empirical strategies of the four 
democracy measurement projects (a) Freedom House
2
, (b) Polity IV
3, (c) Vanhanen’s 
Index of Democracy
4
, and (d) Democracy Index by the Economist
5
. In evaluating 
strengths and weaknesses of each of these approaches, Campbell pointed to inconsistent 
use of democracy indicators, lack of sensitivity in terms of assigning scores to countries, 
and questioned the validity and unbiased character of selected measures. He concluded 
that there is still a gap in terms of empirical assessments of the quality of democracy. A 
                                                          
2
Country reports on democracy functioning in the world are available from Freedom in the World reports 
and can be obtained online from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world.   
3
 For country ratings, see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  
4
 Available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/ 
5
 Available with subscription only at 
https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011 
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work by Collier and Levitsky (1996) further illustrates this point. In their review of 
approximately 150 studies of democracy, they identified over 550 subtypes of democratic 
societies.  
Given a substantial variation in numerous measures of democracy, it is not 
surprising that research on citizens’ democratic attitudes is just as diverse. Most 
knowledge of democratic citizen orientation comes from political science studies of 
support for democracy and public opinion polls. A number of large-scale research 
initiatives have been launched to measure and track a variety of public attitudes toward 
democracy, from support for democratic principles and values to evaluations of 
democratic governance, and others. Among such measures are the World Values Survey 
(WVS)
6
, the European Values Survey
7
, the New Democracies Barometers
8
, the Pew 
Research Center
9
, the International Social Survey Program (ISSP)
10
, and many others. 
These initiatives were designed to collect information on a number of public attitudes that 
are relevant for democracy, including how citizens evaluate and relate to democratic 
institutions in their societies, to what extent mass public understand and adhere to 
democratic principles in their daily lives, what proportion of citizens support democracy 
as a form of governance, and related phenomena. These and other initiatives have 
produced a variety of information related to democratization processes and trends, which, 
                                                          
6
 The WVS contains public survey data from the largest number of countries in comparison with other 
initiatives. Select data from the WVS are available at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/  
7
 Available at http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/ 
8
 Available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog4_0.html, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/start_en.html 
Country specific rankings are available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html, 
http://www.arabbarometer.org/, and other websites. 
9
 Data available at http://pewresearch.org/  
10
 More details are available from the ISSP website http://www.issp.org 
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in turn, has resulted in an array of studies attempting to describe and analyze these 
phenomena. As Diamond (2001) noted, “Public opinion surveys are opening up an 
unprecedented analytic window onto the study of the dynamics of democratic regimes, 
especially what fosters democratic consolidation as opposed to stagnation, instability, or 
even breakdown.” (p. 2). The challenge is to analyze all the available data in a systematic 
way. As Schedler and Sarsfield (2004) noted, “If we wish to deepen our knowledge about 
citizens’ democratic ideas and ideals, the most urgent task is not to collect fresh data, but 
to re-analyze available data in fresh ways” (p. 8).  
Although survey techniques to measure democratic attitudes vary, many 
researchers have relied on one method, known as a “destination model,” as the basis for 
their analyses (Rose, 2009). Generally, destination model surveys ask abstract questions 
about general preferences towards basic ideas of democracy. For example, some 
destination models evaluate individual or population orientations towards an idealized 
model of democracy with ideal market economy and other perfect attributes. Other 
destination approaches utilize questions from studies of older democracies in North 
America and Western Europe, such as support for democracy, satisfaction with the 
performance of democracy, trust in democratic institutions, and others (Diamond, 2008).  
One of the advantages of using destination models to gauge democratic 
orientations among the general public is their consistency in terms of research 
instruments. As a rule, survey questions are phrased in a way that allows for longitudinal 
as well as cross-country comparisons. Indeed, surveys that rely on destination models 
provide a common ground for comparing states with varying degrees of democratization 
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as well as comparing changes in public opinion over time. However, many have voiced 
concerns over this method or opposed it altogether as having many limitations. For 
example, Rose (2009) criticized destination models because of their over-reliance on 
Western values and failure to consider differences found in cultures other than those in 
established democracies. Others have pointed out to the fact that the concept of ideal 
democracy is almost unanimously accepted worldwide and thus fails to explain variation 
in democratic functioning among different societies (Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2006). As Norris (cited in Mattes, 2010) noted, “By the end of the twentieth century, 
overwhelming support is given to the principle of democracy as an ideal form of 
government…” (p. 2). In a similar vein, Inglehart and Welzel (2006) argued that overt 
endorsement of democracy has become almost universal among citizens not only from 
developed democracies but also across societies with undemocratic regimes. Inglehart 
(2003) further argued that abstract questions about ideal democracy that generally result 
in favorable responses lack accuracy and appear of little value in determining public 
attitudes toward the actual democratic functioning.  
Furthermore, in the context of post-communist societies, using ideal democracy as 
a reference point to gauge population attitudes fails to capture the overall picture of how 
the public views democracy de facto. As Rose (2009) noted, “destination surveys 
measure how near or far the values of a population are from goals defined in Western 
terms. Distinctive features of the Communist legacy are left out” (p. 200). Therefore, 
employing such a technique may result in an incomplete or inaccurate picture of citizen 
orientations toward democratic values. In addition, Rose argued that an idealist focus on 
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democracy fails to account for and explain changes that have occurred in a society, since 
the starting point for democratization is a regime that lacks many attributes of a 
representative democracy.  
Not only destination-based surveys appear to attract some criticism on the part of 
researchers or policy makers. Other indicators that measure public support for democracy 
have been the subject of countless scholarly and policy debates as well. Similarly, many 
have questioned the validity of numerous democracy indicators and scores that are 
usually assigned to countries to denote their level of democratic advancement (for 
example, Campbell, 2008; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). For example, Schedler and 
Sarsfield (2004) in their programmatic essay on public opinion surveys of democracy 
analyzed and summarized major challenges that are common for such measures. Overall, 
they singled out four fundamental problems that arise when interpreting data from 
surveys that have been designed to measure democratic attitudes. First, they claimed that 
the so called interviewer effects, a phenomenon the authors equated with the social 
desirability effect, present a substantial challenge and might compromise the validity of 
survey data. In other words, the authors claimed that survey respondents may give 
favorable evaluations of democracy related issues mainly because they might perceive 
them as recognized social values. Of note, this problem was first addressed by Dalton 
(1994) who coined the term “questionnaire democrats” to refer to individuals who give 
such politically correct responses.  
The second and third challenges common for survey measures of democratic 
opinions have to do with the abstract nature of democratic support and democracy per se. 
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In other words, people understand the concept of democracy and interpret democracy 
related issues based on their personal values. As Bratton (2002) noted, democracy “can 
be bent to mean what people want it to mean” (p. 6). Finally, the fourth challenge with 
using public opinion data to test various theories of democracy or provide empirical 
measures of democratic preferences deals with conflicting values that individuals might 
have. An example of such conflicting values is a possible disconnect between political 
preferences and political values. Thus, one might agree with some fundamental principles 
of a functioning democracy and reject other, often less overt, assumptions about 
democratic society. In sum, each of these problems or a combination of them challenges 
the validity of public opinion polls as measures of democratic attitudes.  Schedler and 
Sarsfield thus concluded that a vast majority of public opinion surveys are “ill-designed 
to capture citizen attitudes towards democratic ideas and institutions” (p. 8). Similarly, 
Dalton (2000) wrote in this regard, “Public opinion is becoming more fluid and less 
predictable” (p. 924).  
To respond to some claims that deal with measurement of democratic attitudes, 
Inglehart (2003) suggested that focus of such inquiries be shifted toward exploring 
political attitudes and public support for democratic principles beyond those that 
explicitly mention the most basic elements of a democratic system. Inglehart was among 
the first scholars to empirically document the link between public support for a 
democratic way of life and actual democratic indicators at the societal level. Specifically, 
he showed that individuals’ support for values and principles that did not explicitly relate 
to democracy was a better predictor of the society’s level of democratic development 
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than a general positive orientation toward the concept of democracy. Such support 
attitudes consisted of beliefs related to trust, tolerance, emphasis on self-expression 
values as well as on subjective well-being, and others. 
In his subsequent research with Christian Welzel, Inglehart further established 
that public support for democratic values were more powerful indicators of a society’s 
level of democracy than traditional measures from political or economic fields (Inglehart 
& Welzel, 2006). In particular, they found that citizens’ attitudes and value orientations 
were significantly related to several key aspects of democratic society, such as the quality 
of democratic institutions, the status of women and ethnic minorities, and governance 
effectiveness. Inglehart and Welzel’s (2006) findings have important implications not 
only for the study of mass democratic attitudes and value orientations but also for the 
measurement of democracy per se.  
In sum, although much progress has been achieved in eliciting the nature and 
dynamics of democratic orientations among citizens across different cultures, much 
remains to be uncovered. As Dalton (2000) referred to the state of research on citizen 
attitudes and political behavior, “Although we have greater scientific knowledge, our 
ability to predict and explain political behavior may actually be decreasing. . .” (p. 932). 
Inglehart and Welzel (2006) summarized the state of research on measures of democratic 
orientations in the following way:   
Techniques for measuring public support for democracy are newer and less 
developed than techniques for measuring gross national product, but the relevant 
mass attitudes can be measured – and when they are, they turn out to have an 
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autonomous societal impact that is fully as important as that of economic factors. 
(p. 3).  
Democratic Citizen Orientation: Core Components 
Although there is almost unanimous agreement on the importance of pro-
democratic citizenry for democratic viability, a clear consensus about the structure of 
democratic citizen orientation is yet to be established (Diamond, 1994; Gibson, Duch, & 
Tedin, 1992; Inglehart, 2003; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2004). This complexity is rooted, in 
part, in the latent nature of the concept of democratic citizen orientation, which cannot be 
measured directly but can only be assessed with the help of various measurement tools. 
Different scholars have singled out different aspects of democratic orientation in efforts 
to capture individuals’ beliefs and attitudes that are conducive to democratic 
advancement. For example, Dahl (1971) argued that to make democracy work, citizens 
need to have congruent attitudes about governmental effectiveness and authorities along 
with some willingness to compromise. Lipset and Lakin (2004) claimed that for an 
effective democracy, citizens need to respect the rule of law, differences in opinion, and 
believe in the legitimacy of a democratic regime. In turn, Schimmelfennig (2000, 2002) 
emphasized such qualities of democratic public as respect for human rights, equality of 
opportunity and racial and gender equality.  
In short, a comprehensive review of literature from diverse disciplines suggests 
that there a number of interrelated factors that are believed to be necessary for individuals 
to contribute to stability and advancement of democracy. These factors range from 
feelings of internal political efficacy in psychological inquiries to democratic functioning 
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to perceptions of economic fairness and confidence in public officials. However, there are 
few studies, especially among youth, that involve all of these ingredients.  
Recognizing the highly heterogeneous and often contested nature of democratic 
citizen orientation and emphasizing its interdisciplinary character, this dissertation limits 
the analysis of democratic citizen orientations to four components. These separate but 
interconnected components include the following aspects: (1) civil liberties (2) 
participatory orientations, (3) political efficacy, and (4) trust. The selected components 
are important not only because of their potential to strengthen democracy, but also 
because they shed light on how people treat each other within their communities and the 
larger society. Moreover, these elements reflect the multi-faceted nature of democratic 
citizen orientation and, thus, appear theoretically relevant. Finally, they have been 
frequently utilized in studies of democracy, democratic transitions, and consolidation, 
and can be examined with the data available from the ICCS.  
The sections below describe the identified core components of democratic citizen 
orientation in more detail. Specifically, civil liberties component along with its 
subcomponents are presented first, followed by participatory orientations and political 
efficacy. The section ends with a description of the nature and significance of trust as 
another important ingredient in democratic citizen orientations.  
Civil Liberties 
Appreciation and endorsement of civil liberties has become inseparable from 
democratic discourse and is often equated with a democratic way of life. Despite 
differences in the way civil liberties values are understood and studied, scholars from 
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different disciplines agree that the concept of civil liberties is highly complex. In this 
dissertation, civil liberties is used as an umbrella term that encompasses self-expression 
values, gender equality attitudes, tolerance, and respect for diversity. The rationale for 
focusing on each of these components is presented below.  
Self-expression values. One of the most robust findings in research on concepts 
of democracy is the confirmation of the importance of having a voice in government (for 
example, see Beetham, 1994; Fuchs, 1999; Held, 1996; Schmitter & Karl, 1991; Walt 
Whitman Center, 1997). Freedom of expression is reflective of broader definitions of 
democracy that emphasize its representative aspect and highlight the importance of 
creating and facilitating fair conditions for competing for people’s votes (Dahl, 1971; 
Diamond, 2002). Huntington (1991) argued that freedom of expression, freedom of the 
press, freedom of association, and other freedoms are essential components of a 
democratic society in which citizens have an active role. Inglehart (2003) associated self-
expression values with Postmaterialist emphasis on civil rights and political participation 
and argued that the presence of these values in society increases mass demands for 
democratization.  
The right to have a say in political and social matters appears to be an equally 
recognized value among citizens in states at various stages of democratic development. 
At the same time, the level of importance attributed to this component varies greatly 
between societies with emerging democracies and societies with a well-established 
democratic record.   
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Of note, a substantial body of research supports the relationship between concepts 
of democracy and individual rights, justice, and freedom (Moodie, Markova, & Plichtova, 
1995). For example, in their study of democratic attributes in Scotland and Slovakia, 
Moodie and colleagues (1995) found that among the most important terms associated
 
with democracy were value-oriented concepts, such as individual freedom, justice, and 
individual rights. Similar results were demonstrated in a qualitative study that 
investigated what democracy means to young people in Greece (Magioglou, 2003). Thus, 
it was found that freedom, equality and justice, and the principles and procedures of the 
representative system, such as deliberation or elections, were the most frequently 
mentioned themes.  
Gender equality. One of the conclusions from the literature on democratization is 
confirmation of the importance of equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their gender, 
ethnicity, or race. Positive attitudes toward equal rights and opportunities for every 
citizen, independent of their gender, ethnic or racial origin are at the heart of democracy 
and reflect the democratic ideal of emancipation and tolerance (Hahn, 1998). Applying 
the concept of gender equality to democratic functioning, Tesler and Gao (2009) wrote, 
“Democracy is meaningless if half the citizens of a country do not have equal rights and 
equal access to political influence and power” (p. 198). In his analysis of democratic 
attitudes common for Western and Muslim societies, Norris (2003) cited a lack of 
widespread support for gender equality among the reasons for weak democracy in a 
number of Muslim societies. 
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A smaller body of research has been devoted to studying support for gender 
equality and tolerance towards outgroups among younger generations. In Australia, 
Kennedy and Mellor (2006) explored several concepts related to adolescent students’ 
perceptions of diversity and tolerance. The researchers found that female students were 
more likely to support women’s political rights as well as immigrants’ rights in 
comparison with male students. The 1999 Civic Education Study (CIVED) used a set of 
six items to capture students’ attitudes toward women’s political rights (Torney-Purta et 
al., 2001). Both surveys found that females were more supportive of women’s rights than 
were males; these findings were consistent with the outcomes of other studies (Furnham 
& Gunter, 1989; Hahn, 1998). The CIVED further revealed that students across countries 
overwhelmingly tended to agree with statements in favor of and to disagree with 
statements against equal rights for women. However, students in countries with lower 
GDP per capita and higher unemployment rates were somewhat less supportive of 
women’s political rights (Torney-Purta et al., 2001, p. 107). 
Tolerance and respect for diversity. Central to understanding the equality 
aspect of democratic citizen orientation is tolerance towards minority groups. A quick 
review of relevant literature suggests that tolerance is a multidimensional concept that 
encompasses many beliefs, values, and behaviors that are essential to a functioning 
democracy. Political tolerance, in particular, refers to citizens' respect for political rights 
and civil liberties of all groups in society, including those with completely opposite views 
and ideas (Brody, 1993).  
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Although researchers differ in their explanations of sources and consequences of 
effective democratic functioning, there is a general consensus that tolerance of outgroups 
is key to democracy. For example, Garbarino (2011) viewed diversity as foundation for 
pluralism, an inseparable part of a democratic society. In turn Gibson (1998) argued that 
the existence of meaningful opposition requires tolerance of others who have different 
views or disagree with a certain issue or set of norms. Tessler and Gao (2009) linked 
tolerance with the legitimacy of democratic regime and considered it the essence of 
participatory democracy. In similar vein, others considered that tolerance of outgroups 
may be the “litmus test” of a functioning democracy (Schedler & Sarsield, 2004). 
Moreover, some researchers have adopted a new classification of democratic societies 
based on whether and in what ways states recognize minorities (Smooha 2002; Van Den 
Berghe 2002).     
In the context of aspiring democracies, tolerance has been found to facilitate 
democratic consolidation by increasing citizens’ support for democratic regime. In his 
research on post-communist transformation, Rose (2009) established that citizens who 
display higher levels of political tolerance were significantly more likely to view 
democratic regime positively than those who had lower levels of political tolerance. In 
more detail, Rose found that tolerance accounted for almost a third of the variance in 
individuals’ support for democratic regimes, after controlling for the effect of other 
influences.   
In sum, an important aspect of democratic orientation consists of valuation of 
freedoms and liberties as well as attitudes towards various groups in a larger community, 
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including gender equality and tolerance towards minority groups. Yet, many gaps remain 
in the literature about the origins of positive attitudes towards minority groups, 
consequences of gender equality, and related attitudes. Researchers continue to debate 
individual sources of these values as well as country-level indicators that might account 
for variation within them.   
Participatory Orientation  
Democratic citizen participation is a broad concept that encompasses a multitude 
of ways through which citizens can express their attitudes toward the political system as 
well as toward others within their communities and the larger society. Classic and 
contemporary scholars of democracy have emphasized the fundamental role of citizen 
participation in civic and political activities in effective democratic functioning. For 
example, Dahl (1971) claimed that citizens’ participation in political life is an essential 
component of democratic society.  Indeed, the idea of citizen participation in political and 
social domains is at the heart of democracy. As Print (2007) noted, “citizen participation 
is the very raison d’etre of democracy” (p. 327). According to Ostrom (1996), civic 
engagement and association “can be thought of as at the core of what it means to be a 
democracy” (p. 755). In a similar vein, Schulz, Ainley, and Van de Gaer (2010) viewed 
participation as “one of the pillars of a democracy whose functioning relies to a great 
extent on contributions of its citizens to the democratic process” (p. 2). Overall, active 
participation in social and political life has long been considered “as hallmarks of the 
good democratic citizen” (Madsen, 1987, p. 580). Thus individual participatory beliefs 
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and behaviors appear important and theoretically relevant constructs in the study of 
democratic citizen orientation.   
Generally, the significance and benefits of participation-oriented citizenry for a 
democratic system are rarely contested. For the most part, democratization scholars agree 
that structures within society that encourage citizen participation are key to sustainable 
and healthy development of democratic society (Almond & Verba, 1960; Crick, 1998, 
2002; International IDEA, 1999, 2002; Print, 2007; Putnam, 2000). Participation and 
inclusion of all citizens, including children and young adults has been increasingly 
recognized as an essential ingredient in building strong families, communities, and 
democratic societies (Smith, 2009). In more detail, specific benefits have been identified 
as the rationale for promoting greater citizen involvement in modern societies. For 
example, Putnam (1993, 2000) considered citizen participation in terms of positive 
outcomes for social relations and linked it with enhanced social capital and cohesion. In a 
similar vein, Mascherini, Vidoni, and Manca (2011) viewed individual engagement in 
various social and political activities as a “tool for accumulating social capital and 
enhancing social cohesion” (p. 791). In turn, the Power Commission, a comprehensive 
initiative that sought to re-engage British citizens with democracy, outlined the following 
desired outcomes of citizen participation: strengthening the dialogue between higher 
authorities and the general public, addressing the increasing influence of undemocratic 
forces, promoting political equality among all segments of society, increasing legitimacy 
of elected governments, and other outcomes (The Power Inquiry, 2006).  
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In their review of civic engagement among adolescents in the U.S., Flanagan and 
Levine (2010) claimed that civically involved youth is important for the functioning of 
democracy. In more detail, they outlined a number of reasons why participation in civic 
maters is important to the health and performance of democracy. For example, by 
participating in community affairs, youth “can contribute their insights to public debates 
and their energies to addressing these problems” (p. 160). On a national scale, younger 
generations can be “a force for political change, by bringing new perspectives on political 
issues and offering fresh solutions” (p. 160). Furthermore, in an international context, 
youth can “help stabilize democratic societies by directing their discontent into 
constructive channels.” (p. 160). Other studies (for example, Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 
1995) have emphasized the links between adolescent participation and later involvement 
as adult citizens.  
Importantly, not only civic engagement among youth is important for 
democracies, but it also is beneficial to younger populations themselves. Among potential 
personal and psychological benefits of youth involvement, Flanagan and Levine (2010) 
noted fulfillment of the human need to belong, feeling of larger life purpose beyond the 
pursuit of individual gain, and others. Additionally, participation in youth organizations 
was found to have positive effects on internal political efficacy among lower and upper 
secondary students (Schulz, 2005).  
Despite almost unanimous consensus with regard to benefits of citizen 
participation in social and political matters, there are differences in the way participation 
is operationalized and measured. One of the challenges of assessing and comparing 
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citizen participation in different settings or across time is related to the fact that many 
such measures employ perception based techniques rather than observations of the 
phenomenon of interest (Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011). In addition, another 
limitation with regard to measuring citizen participation has to do with the fact that 
“identically-labeled indicators are used in different setting with rather different meanings, 
and it is therefore challenging to develop consistent indicators that can allow conclusions 
to be drawn across local, state, and national frameworks” (Cavaye, 2004, as cited in 
Mascherini, Vidoni, & Manca, 2011, p. 792).  
In addressing these challenges, different scholars have suggested different 
approaches to measuring citizen participation. For example, Print (2006) proposed a set 
of three indicators to assess citizens’ overall engagement with political and social 
matters. First, he focused on civic indicators that included information related to 
membership in civic organizations, volunteering, participation in community projects, 
fundraising for charities, and others. Secondly, he singled out a group of electoral 
indicators that gather data related to voting, involvement in political parties and 
contributions to political campaigns. Finally, Print distinguished a set of political 
engagement indicators that consisted of participation in protests, writing petitions 
(including email and internet engagement), boycotting products, and related activities.  
Putnam’s (2000) conceptualization of democratic participation is centered around 
the theme of civic engagement and is viewed in tandem with social capital. Specifically, 
Putnam used membership in national organizations and community groups as indicators 
of citizen participation. Others have distinguished between different forms of citizen 
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democratic participation. Thus, Kaase (1990) singled out two main types of citizen 
engagement (a) conventional engagement, such as voting, running for office and (b) 
unconventional or social movement engagement, such as participation in grass-root 
campaigns, protest activities, and other less formal activities.  
With regard to younger populations, research on participation is less uniquely 
defined. Given the limitations 14-year-old students face with regard to active 
participation, behavioral intentions for what they expect to do in the future has emerged 
as being of particular importance for this age group (Schulz, Ainley, & Van de Gaer, 
2010, p. 3).  
Despite a growing attention to issues of citizen participation in political and social 
spheres and efforts to promote citizen engagement in many states, democratic 
participation has been on decline (Dalton, 19999; Putnam, 2000; Schulz, Ainley, & Van 
de Gaer, 2010). Although declining citizen participation is a problem of many modern 
societies, it has become especially evident in established democracies where fewer and 
fewer citizens appear be actively engaged in political and social matters (Dalton, 1999). 
Of note, these negative trends are especially characteristic of younger populations (Kirby 
& Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009; McDonald, 2008). For example, in the United States, 
political scientists and sociologists have been observing the downward trend in youth 
voting since the 1970s (Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009). Exceptions have been 
2004 and 2008 presidential elections when youth turnout rate almost doubled (Kirby & 
Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009). In their analysis of generational differences in life goals, 
concern for others, and civic orientation among young adults in the U.S., Twenge, 
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Campbell, and Freeman (2012) found that today’s young Americans were less concerned 
with social problems and had less interest in government in comparison with older 
generations. In addition, they documented that modern young people were less likely “to 
participate in the political process through voting, writing to a public official, 
participating in demonstrations or boycotts, or giving money to a political cause” than 
older generations (p. 12). That today’s youths “are less engaged in civic and political 
activities than their predecessors were 30 years ago” is supported by evidence from a 
number of surveys, including National Election Surveys, General Social Surveys (in the 
United States), that document declines in various forms of engagement among younger 
populations (Flanagan, Levine, & Settersten, 2009, p. 1).  
Similar observations were made and documented in other developed democracies. 
For example, in Great Britain, youth participation in national elections presents a similar 
picture of disengaged youth. The Electoral Commission (2005) documented that the 
youth vote declined to 37%, the lowest turnout on record. In Canada’s 2000 elections, 
only 22% of young voters cast their votes (Pammett & LeDuc, 2003). Australia, a 
country with compulsory voting for all citizens, shows surprisingly low levels of youth 
voting (Print, Saha, & Edwards, 2004). However, it is important to remember that 
although important, voting is just one aspect of citizen democratic participation. That is 
why it is critical to consider other dimensions of citizen involvement that extend beyond 
voting or other traditional indicators of political involvement.    
Others have also documented limited interest and involvement of younger 
generations in public and political life (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito, & Kerr, 2008). 
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According to results of a recent large-scale study of young adults by Smith et al. (2011), 
only about 4% of modern young people are “genuinely civically and politically engaged” 
(p. 208). Sloam (2007) wrote about young people’s alienation from political and social 
processes, “The current generation of young people see themselves as individuals 
distanced from the state and politics, … they [youth] expect less from the state and 
consequently have a weaker sense of solidarity,” (p. 550). He further noted that is 
reflected in “the weakening of political socialization and attachment to conventional 
forms of politics” (p. 550).   
Of note, most of the conclusions from the literature on civic participation among 
different populations have been drawn from empirical studies of established democracies. 
Information about the nature of individuals’ engagement in social and political activities 
of countries, other than Western Europe or is less easily available. Especially scarce in 
this regard is trend data. More generally, Dalton noted about a lack of international data 
on political behaviors and attitudes of ordinary citizens, “A notable feature for 
comparative politics is the limited attention to these questions in the non-American 
literature” (p. 921).       
In sum, one of the robust findings of democratization research is that citizen 
participation is a vital component of a healthy democracy and is essential for its effective 
functioning (Smart, 2000; UNICEF, 2007). Friedland (2006) summarized the importance 
of politically engaged citizenry, “in a functioning legitimate democracy . . . citizens do 
need to vote, follow news, and that solidarity with fellow citizens in some form is 
necessary” (p. 2). Given that democracy can function most effectively when its citizens 
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show an active interest in countries’ social and political affairs, the observed declines in 
young people’s involvement in social and political activities is of concern and should be 
given more attention.   
Political Efficacy 
One of the key values associated with a democratic way of life is a feeling of 
political efficacy, a belief that “one has the skills to influence the political system’’ 
(Zimmerman, 1989, p. 554). Democratic theorists traditionally have emphasized the 
importance of citizens’ feelings of efficacy by singling it out as one of the main factors 
that contribute to the legitimacy of a democratic regime and its stability (Finkel, 1985; 
Rudolph et al., 2000). Recalling from studies reviewed above, citizens’ confidence in the 
legitimacy of government is positively linked to societal stability. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that political efficacy would be another influential factor in the 
functioning of democracy and, thus, a relevant component of citizen democratic 
orientation.      
Early inquiries into the study of political efficacy are essential to the modern 
understanding of the concept. Researchers from different disciplines have contributed to 
theoretical accounts of political efficacy. With roots in Albert Bandura’s seminal work on 
self-efficacy in human behavior, the concept of political efficacy is generally used to 
denote a positive feeling that “political and social change is possible, and that the 
individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (Campbell, Gurin, & 
Miller, 1954, p. 187). First efforts to operationalize the concept date back to mid-1950s, 
when Campbell and colleagues developed a scaled measure of political efficacy. 
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Specifically, they used four statements about individuals’ attitudes toward political 
processes, including the following items: "People like me don't have any say about what 
the government does"; "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a 
person like me can't really understand what is going on"; and "I don't think public 
officials care much what people like me think." Although Campbell’s conceptualization 
gained much popularity and was commonly used as a measure of citizen political 
efficacy, other researchers have adopted slightly different approaches to conceptualizing 
political efficacy. For example, in an effort to conceptualize political efficacy, Janowitz 
and Marvick (1956) proposed the term “political self-competence” and Almond and 
Verba (1963) used the phrase “subjective political competence” (as cited in Madsen, 
1987, p. 572). In the 1990s, Bandura applied the concept of self-efficacy to political 
domain to define a new concept that is rooted in “the belief that one can produce effects 
through political action” (1993, p. 483). He also established that feelings of political 
efficacy were context-bound, with individuals displaying different levels of political 
efficacy, depending on “domains of activities, situational circumstances, and functional 
roles” (Bandura, 1997, p. 485).  
One of the most important features of political efficacy is its multidimensional 
character. Two commonly used dimensions of political efficacy are (a) internal and (b) 
external (Anderson, 2010; Bandura, 1993; Finkel, 1985; Iyengar, 1980; Niemi, Craig, & 
Mattei, 1991). Internal political efficacy refers to a sense of efficacy or control to 
influence political developments. In turn, external political efficacy is understood in 
terms of perceptions of the effectiveness of political system or responsiveness of political 
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figures to the needs of the general public. Although the distinction between internal and 
external forms of political efficacy is the most commonly utilized classification, it is just 
one way of addressing the multidimensional character of the concept. Different 
approaches differentiate between other aspects of political efficacy. Easton and Dennis 
(1967), for example, singled out three aspects of political efficacy (a) normative, (b) 
psychological, and (c) a behavioral aspect. They argued that each aspect represented 
separate but interdependent elements that are key to understanding the nature of political 
efficacy. In more detail, the normative aspect refers to “the expectation in democracies 
that members will feel able to act effectively in politics” (p. 26) and that citizens will 
view their local or national authorities as responsive agents. Psychological aspect of 
political efficacy identifies “a disposition towards politics, a feeling of effectiveness and 
capacity in the political sphere” (p. 26). Finally, in behavioral terms, political efficacy has 
to do with the actual behavior of a given individual or a group of individuals. Easton and 
Dennis claimed that such a differentiation between three different aspects helps avoid 
confusion and ambiguity that are often associated with the term.  
Apart from theoretical inquiries, political efficacy has been often utilized in 
empirical studies. In the political domain, the concept of political efficacy has been 
commonly used in studies of political behavior. Especially numerous in this regard are 
studies investigating the impact of political efficacy on political participation or lack of 
thereof. Citizens who display higher levels of political self-efficacy have been found to 
engage more frequently in various political activities (Abrams & DeMoura, 2002; Finkel, 
1985; Rudolph et al., 2000). In turn, it has also been suggested that deficits of political 
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efficacy can result in alienation from political processes. Importantly, early research has 
also established the reciprocal character of political efficacy, with feelings of political 
efficacy influencing a number of feelings and behaviors and vice versa.  
Some researchers have investigated the relationship between political efficacy and 
trust in political institutions. Thus, external political efficacy has been found to be 
associated with general trust in the functioning of the political system and institutions 
(Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). In addition, evidence was established that individuals 
who report higher levels of political efficacy are psychologically engaged in political and 
social matters (Cohen, Vigoda, & Samorly, 2001).        
Political efficacy has been a popular concept in comparative research. With regard 
to studies of transitioning democracies, a few interesting observations are of interest. For 
example, Rose (2009) analyzed a number of the New Russia Barometer
11
 surveys that 
measured citizens’ political efficacy beliefs and concluded that modern populations in 
post-communist societies do not perceive themselves as having more influence on 
government than under the former regime. At the same time, Rose noted that in spite of 
the continuing lack of political efficacy, the majority of people nowadays believe that the 
state can no longer control their lives as was the case in the previous regime. Rose’s 
findings are consistent with earlier research on political efficacy among citizens in 
transitioning societies that emphasized low levels of political efficacy among the general 
public. Thus, in his research on the course of democratic transformations in post-
communist societies, Krastev (2007) explained that ordinary citizens experienced 
                                                          
11
 The New Russia Barometer has been conducting public opinions surveys in Russia since 1992. More 
information about surveys is available at http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html  
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transitional democracies as regimes where voters “could change governments but could 
not change policies” (p. 59).     
Research on political efficacy among adolescents and young adults is less 
common in comparison with studies among adults. In part, a smaller body of research on 
political efficacy among adolescents can be explained by the fact that adolescents have 
limited opportunities to engage in political activities that contribute to the development of 
feelings and attitudes associated with political efficacy. At the same time, others have 
argued that despite some limitations and difficulties in applying political efficacy to study 
children and adolescents, political efficacy has been identified as a valid construct for 
children (Easton & Dennis, 1967; Hess & Torney, 1967). In particular, Easton and 
Dennis argued that “by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude..., which 
we could call a sense of political efficacy.” (p. 31).  
Different scholars focused on different aspects of political efficacy among 
younger generations. For example, Salomon (1984) investigated sixth graders’ efficacy 
beliefs about media and found that the former was related to the amount of effort 
adolescents put into processing information from a specific media source, television or 
print. In exploring the effect of television viewing on adolescents’ civic participation, 
Hoffman and Thompson (2009) established a positive relationship between the two 
variables of interest and also found that it was mediated by adolescents’ political efficacy. 
Another researcher undertook a cross-cultural analysis of political efficacy among 
adolescents from five countries (Hahn, 1998). She discovered that adolescents from 
Denmark and the United States were more efficacious than their peers from Germany, 
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Netherlands, and England. In addition, Hahn found that adolescents from all countries 
reported low levels of confidence in their ability to influence explicit political decisions. 
By contrast, most participants reported high to moderate levels of confidence in 
influencing governmental decisions made by groups. An interesting gender aspect of 
political efficacy was documented in the initial analyses of ICCS data, which revealed 
that male students reported higher levels of internal political efficacy than did female 
students.    
A significant amount of efficacy research among children and adolescents focuses 
on the role of schools in fostering such attitudes. Most such studies emphasize the 
formative role of school environment in shaping adolescents’ beliefs, including feelings 
of political efficacy. According to Bandura (1997), adolescents’ beliefs about their 
efficacy with regard to political and social situations are related to the extent to which 
adolescents take part in school activities.  
In sum, based on earlier theoretical and empirical inquiries into key conditions 
necessary for democratic maintenance and development, political efficacy appears to be 
an important component. Therefore, it is justifiable to include adolescents’ confidence in 
their ability to make meaningful contributions to political and social in this research.  
Trust  
Few topics receive as much attention in democratization studies as issues related 
to trust. In general, there is almost a unanimous agreement that some form of trust is 
required for the growth and development of a democratic society (Fisher, Van Heerde, & 
Tucker, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 2005; Rose, 2004; Uslaner, n.d., 2008; Van der Meer, 
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2010). The vast literature on trust provides various accounts of the importance of trusting 
citizenry. For example, Dahl (1971) considered trust among key conditions of effective 
“polarchy” (democracy) and Inglehart (1999) argued that trust was the foundation of a 
democratic society. According to Moises (2006), trust appears “necessary social cohesion 
required by the functioning of complex, unequal and differentiated societies” (p. 591). 
Other researchers have claimed that trust enhances the legitimacy and stability of the 
government by linking citizens with government representatives through relevant 
institutions (Levi & Stoker, 2000). As Blind (2006) noted, “[trust] emerges as one of the 
most important ingredients upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political 
systems are built.” (p. 3).  
A growing body of research on trust has documented various relationships 
between the levels of trust in society and a number of social, economic, and political 
phenomena. For example, Uslaner (2006) argued that trust is the key to better 
government, greater economic growth, and more tolerance among members of the 
society. According to him, more trusting societies have less corruption than societies with 
lower levels of trust. Putnam (1993) considered trust an essential component of social 
capital and related it to more efficient local governments. Fukuyama (1995, 2000) 
believed that the level of trust among the members of society was a strong predictor of 
economic success. A study of trust among students from states at various stages of 
democratic development showed that students with higher levels of trust were more likely 
to be involved in civic and political activities than those who were less trusting (Torney-
Purta, Richardson, & Barber, 2004). Results of this study also supported earlier claims 
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that individuals from states with a durable and stable democratic record have higher 
levels of trust than those from states in aspiring democracies. Norris (1999) used 
Freedom House ratings to show that trust is higher in states with better records of respect 
to political rights and civil liberties. In addition to establishing a significant positive 
relationship between students’ trust and their expected civic engagement, Torney-Purta, 
Richardson, and Barber (2004) also found that this relationship was complex, with many 
covariates influencing the direction of the relationship.    
Of note, research findings vary on the nature of the relationship between trust and 
political and civic engagement, which, in turn, are closely related to democratic 
developments within society (Torney-Purta et al., 2001). There is an ongoing debate 
whether trusting people are more likely to participate in political life or be passive 
citizens. A general assumption is that political trust is a necessary foundation on which 
citizen participation is built (Marschall, 2001; Putnam, 1993; 2000). For example, 
research by Torney-Purta and colleagues (2001, 2004) indicated that individuals with 
higher levels of trust were more likely to participate in civic and political activities than 
those with lower trust levels. Conversely, Uslaner and Brown (2005) suggested that it 
may actually be a lack of trust that leads to citizen engagement in political matters. In a 
similar vein, others suggested some mistrust in government may, in fact, be beneficial 
with regard to citizen engagement and might increase political participation, especially 
when combined with higher levels of political efficacy (Haste , 2004; Kahne & 
Westheimer, 2006). Furthermore, Levi and Stoker (2000) in their overview of literature 
on political trust questioned a widespread assumption that more trusting citizens were 
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more likely to participate in political activities. They concluded that only in combination 
with other more influential factors political trust can be equated with engagement in 
political activities. Hardin (1999) considered trust irrelevant for the functioning of the 
democratic government. According to him, for trust to emerge, there should be sufficient 
interest and knowledge on the part of the involved individual towards another individual 
or an institution. Therefore, Hardin claimed that distant relations often characterizing the 
relationship between ordinary citizens and the government are insufficient for the 
emergence of trust. 
Despite these claims, political trust is considered an important ingredient in the 
functioning of modern democracies, regardless of the level of democratic advancement. 
By contrast, a lack or absence of trust is often viewed as a threat to sustainable 
development within society. Given the importance of a trusting citizenship for a 
country’s development, it is not surprising that many researchers and policymakers have 
expressed concerns about declining levels of political trust worldwide. The World 
Economic Forum (2002) drew the global attention to alarming declines in public trust in 
key institutions essential for society’s development. Drawing on the results of a Gallup 
International survey, conducted in 47 countries and representative of 1.4 billion citizens 
across the world, the Forum reiterated the fact that trust was at record low levels. 
Importantly, it was found that out of the 17 institutions that were examined, the principal 
political institution in each state (parliament, congress, etc.) was the least trusted. 
Unfortunately, the results of this particular survey did not come as a surprise – over the 
past couple of decades, political scientists, sociologists, and statisticians have registered a 
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steady decline in trust attitudes among world’s population (Lenard, 2005). Similarly, 
surveys conducted among adolescents and young adults show a consistent decline in 
positive responses to trust-related questions (Blind 2006; Lenard, 2005; Mishler & Rose, 
2001, 2005). In his analysis of trust trends among youths, Dalton (2002) argued that the 
next generation has a likelihood of being distrusting toward political institutions. Of note, 
a continuing decline in citizens’ trust is a worrying trend in advanced democracies as well 
as those states that are at various stages of democratic transformations.  
Some concerns over declining trust have been tested empirically and evidence 
was found that deficits of trust can cause a number of adverse impacts. A substantial 
body of research has linked declines in trust to various negative consequences for the 
government and society as a whole, such as political passivity expressed through voting 
behavior (Jones & Hudson, 2000), tax evasion as an expression of unwillingness to 
cooperate with the state (Orviska & Hudson, 2003), and excessive and inefficient 
managerial practices (Ruscio, 1996). In his research on social polarization in Armenia, 
Harutyunyan (2006) came to conclusion that low levels of social and political trust 
among citizens go hand-in-hand with low scores of democracy. Similarly, Mishler and 
Rose (2005) argued that deficits of trust in political institutions might increase support for 
undemocratic regimes.  
In sum, there is an agreement that trust is an essential ingredient in the 
functioning of modern democratic societies (Mishler & Rose, 2005; Rose, 2004; Torney-
Purta et al., 2004; Uslaner, n.d., 2008; Van der Meer, 2010). Citizens with higher levels 
of trust have been found to be more involved in civic and political actions than those with 
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less trust in state institutions or authorities. However, more remains to be uncovered with 
regard to the nature of this relationship as well as the relationship between trust and other 
forms of democratic citizen orientation, particularly across different age groups and 
across cultures.  
Democratic Citizen Orientations in Aspiring and Established Democracies 
Over the past several decades, there has been a dramatic increase in democratic 
developments across the world (Damon, 1998; Geddes, 1999; Hungtingon, 1991; Torney-
Purta et al., 2001). The third wave of democratization, a term introduced by Samuel 
Huntington (1991) to denote a rapid expansion of democratic regimes in different parts of 
the world, brought many changes to the political outlook of the modern world. A defining 
phenomenon of this period was a substantial increase in the number of countries that 
began to be classified as democratic states (Diamond, 1997). Reports from the Freedom 
House, a nongovernmental organization that has been analyzing and promoting 
democratic developments globally for over seven decades, are illustrative in this regard. 
According to Freedom in the World 2011, the latest annual survey of the state of global 
political rights and civil liberties, the number of countries qualifying as free democracies 
stood at 87, almost a twofold increase from 1972, when there were 44 free democratic 
states. Overall, nearly 43% of today’s global population lives in democratic countries.  
Changes in the democratic outlook of the world have been accompanied by a 
surge of interest on the part of scholars who have tried to explore, explain, and predict the 
course of democratic advancement. In many ways, a starting point of academic inquiries 
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into the global democratic expansion is a discussion on what democracy means for the 
general population and how it is perceived (Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1997; 2003a). 
Generally, democracy enjoys a predominantly positive image not only among 
populations of established democracies in Western Europe and the United States, but in 
societies across the world. In present-day Central Europe, unlike in Europe in the 1930s, 
there is no ideological alternative to democracy (Krastev, 2007). As Gilley (2009) noted, 
“Democracies tend to produce polities that are more stable, wealthier, fairer, more 
innovative, and better at respecting rights than any available alternatives” (p. 114). Some 
have argued that democracy has become the global dominant regime (for example, 
Campbell, 2008) and others consider it an emerging universal value (Diamond, 2008). A 
great deal of empirical data supports these claims.  
One of the most robust findings from surveys of popular support for democracy is 
the persistence of favorable opinions toward democracy as the best form of government 
across the globe (Diamond, 2008). Thus upon reviewing literature on democratic 
progress in the world and in particular on the way citizens in different regions of the 
world view democracy, Diamond (2008) concluded that the majority of citizens in every 
part of the globe “consistently avow their support for democracy as a goal” (p. x). In 
more detail, based on the findings of the World Values Survey, he documented that 
approximately 80% of citizens in every region of the world, including transitioning 
societies in Eastern and Central Europe and semi-democratic states in the Muslim Middle 
East, show high support for democracy. As noted in a report of the Pew Research 
Center’s Global Attitudes Project dedicated to the 20 years anniversary after the 
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disintegration of the Soviet Union, “Eastern Europeans have largely embraced 
democratic values. Most want civil liberties, competitive elections and other tenets of 
democracy” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009, p. 21).  
However, despite the overwhelming support democracy enjoys in the world, it 
does not perform in the same way in all of the world’s regions and countries. As Berman 
(2010) noted, “the disagreeable, perhaps even tragic, fact that in much of the world the 
conditions most favorable to the development and maintenance of democracy are 
nonexistent, or at best only weakly present” (p. 145). Rose’s (2009) observation is 
particularly illustrative in this regard. He observed that “elections in the majority of post-
Soviet states routinely demonstrate that unfree and unfair practices from the Soviet era 
persist through the present days” (p. 114).   
Some scholars view public dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy and 
a lack of confidence in the future of democracy among the major obstacles on the way to 
a successful democratic consolidation (for example, Diamond, 2008). Others have 
pointed to high levels of apathy and alienation among the general public as reasons for 
deteriorating democratic performance in many modern societies, which adds to 
frustration with democracy (Rose, 2004). For example, Flanagan and Sherrod (1998) 
expressed concerns with regard to growing disparities on a number of indicators of social 
and economic well-being among different population groups and argued that such all-
penetrating inequalities can lead to “civic disaffection and the lack of social integration,” 
especially among younger generations (p. 450).  
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Alternatively, many theorists have argued that a lack of advancement in 
democratization processes across many societies in transition is related to inability or 
unwillingness of the general population to adapt to new democratic realities and their 
general resistance to or even incompatibility with democratic values (Chandler, 2006; 
Fukuyama, 2001; Huntington, 1993, 1996). In a similar vein, others have expressed an 
opinion that “people in certain cultures have an inherently weak desire for greater 
freedoms, economic opportunity, and democratic accountability” (Walker, 2011, p. 2). 
Indeed, public doubts about benefits and merits of democracy as applied to their societies 
are among the most commonly cited arguments that seek to explain failures of 
democratic reforms and a lack of democratic advancement. For example, according to the 
global survey Voice of the People 2006, citizens in Central European states are most 
skeptical about the merits of democracy in comparison with citizens in other regions of 
the world (Krastev, 2007). A persistent lack of tangible improvements in many aspects of 
social reality resulted in frustration with the whole concept of transition and growing 
skepticism about current and future democratic development.  
Findings from the 2011 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project12 further 
support this point. According to this report, less than a quarter of the total population in 
post-communist countries, such as Russia, Lithuania and Ukraine, give positive 
assessment of the current state of democracy in their countries. Of note, younger 
generations are happier with the way democracy is working in their states than are their 
older counterparts. By contrast, support for democracy as the best form of government is 
                                                          
12
 Full report is available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/12/05/confidence-in-democracy-and-
capitalism-wanes-in-former-soviet-union/ 
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widespread among citizens in established democracies, although some have warned about 
declines in favorable attitudes toward democracy in advanced democratic states (for 
example, Dalton, 2004). At the same time, it is important to note that despite some 
disillusionment with democratic transformations, people in the majority of post-
communist states still value democratic ideals and “embrace key features of democracy, 
such as fair judiciary and free media” (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011, p. 1).  
Despite obvious differences in democratic attitudes between citizens in 
established and aspiring democracies, there are some similarities in terms of their 
endorsement, or lack of thereof, of key aspects of democratic citizen orientation. For 
example, political efficacy, an essential component of democratically oriented citizens 
seems to be in deficit among both citizens in established and aspiring democracies. Thus, 
according to a report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2009), no modern country 
has a majority of citizens who agree with a statement “most elected officials care what 
people like me think” (p. 33). Similarly, hostile opinions towards ethnic, racial, or other 
minority groups are equally pervasive in established and aspiring democracies. For 
example, 84% of citizens in Czech Republic have an unfavorable view of the Roma 
minorities, the same percentage as in Italy (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2009). Of note, 
although many citizens in post-communist societies of Eastern and Central Europe 
express negative views of specific minorities in their societies, the majority of them 
endorse the ideal of a pluralistic society. Thus more than half of citizens in established 
and new democracies agree with a statement “It is a good thing for any society to be 
made up of people from different races, religions and cultures” (p. 49).  
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Overall, despite a voluminous body of literature that focuses on public support for 
democracy within a specific nation or world region, cross-regional studies of democratic 
orientations are few (Mattes, 2010). Many scholars and political leaders have voiced 
concerns over economic and political processes in transitioning countries that might 
threaten democratic developments or even lead to a return to a totalitarian system 
(Diamond, 2001; Motyl, 2004; Walker, 2011).  
In sum, democracy appears to enjoy universal support and, as Diamond (2008) 
suggested, the prospects for democracy seem favorable. People in different parts of the 
world seem to be naturally drawn to freedoms and liberties that accompany democracy as 
well as to basic values and principles that allow for a democratic way of life. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the majority of post-communist countries have adopted the democratization 
agenda over the past two decades. However, the process has produced mixed results with 
regard to citizens’ acceptance of democratic values and principles. While there are 
different opinions about why democracy have not yet taken root in some Eastern and 
Central European societies, a common theme uniting them is that of the communist past. 
The sections that follow briefly review the literature on historical legacies and examine 
links between citizen democratic orientation and different types of historical legacies.   
Historical Legacies and Democratic Citizen Orientation  
The historical legacies literature provides a useful framework for analyzing 
democratic attitudes among the general public and for comparing them across different 
regions. Although scholars disagree about the criteria that are used to define a historical 
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legacy, there is a general consensus that the past matters (Wittenberg, 2010). In the words 
of Joseph Schumpeter (quoted in Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006): 
No decade in the history of politics, religion, technology, painting, poetry and 
what not ever contains its own explanation. In order to understand the religious 
events from 1520 to 1530 or the political events from 1790 to 1800 or the 
developments in painting from 1900 to 1910, you must survey a period of much 
wider span (p. 25).  
In his programmatic essay about the role and impact of history, Tilly (2006) listed 
a number of reasons why “history matters” and why explanations in political field are not 
sufficient without a thorough historical analysis of past events, including past regimes. In 
a similar vein, Eckstein (cited in Dalton, 2000) wrote that, “… political cultures change 
only gradually and often there is a syncretism between the cultural norms of the ancien 
regime and the new political order” (p. 915). 
Many studies of historical legacies emphasize the impact of past regimes and 
traditions for the development of contemporary institutions and, less often, behavioral 
norms and beliefs. Empirical research has documented the consistency with which older 
institutional arrangements and norms persist into the present (Barany & Volgyes, 1995; 
Bunce, 2005; Kitschelt et al., 1999). For example, Gibson (2001) argued that the legacy 
of totalitarianism in Russia manifests itself in people’s continued mistrust of authorities, 
weak civil society, overemphasis on personal networks and disregard of formal 
structures, among others. Analyzing the impact of Stalinism on Russia’s contemporary 
society, Bernhard (1996) wrote that Stalinist legacy still persists in political cultures 
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across post-Soviet societies and is evident in citizens’ “learned helplessness, receptivity 
to paternalism, and a confrontational attitude toward conflict” (p. 323). Indeed, upon 
analyzing obstacles to successful democratization in many transitioning states, Diamond 
(2008) noted a particularly weak state of the rule of law, which he partly attributed to a 
generally accepted proposition that informal practices of personal power often “trump” 
formal institutions and laws (p. 145).  
Furthermore, in the case of studies focusing on democratic transitions and 
consolidation, historical legacies are often linked to failures or successes in the process of 
democratization (Bunce, 2004; Motyl, 2004; Wittenberg, 2010). For example, in his 
analysis of Urugway’s democratic development, Gillispie (1986) proposed that “the 
degree of restoration of the democratic ancient regime is proportional to the length of the 
previous democracy’s life, and inversely related to the length of the authoritarian 
interlude” (p. 193). In their review of post-communist political parties, Kitschelt, 
Mansfedova, Markowski, and Toka (1999) documented how pre-communist political 
infrastructure influenced the development of post-communist political arrangements.  
Ishiyama (2009) further investigated the role of historical legacies with regard to 
political party affiliation among citizens in the former Soviet Union and East-Central 
Europe. Specifically, he studied how and to what extent institutional legacy of the 
communist regime affected the emergence of a structured party system in different 
societies. In more detail, Ishiyama sought to establish whether historical legacies help 
explain the growth of the “red-brown” phenomenon, which he identified as a political 
movement of extreme right voters who “glorify a national past, are often irredentist or 
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imperialist …, are intolerant of “aliens,” and oppose globalization” (p. 485). The results 
revealed that emergence of extreme right political parties and the proportion of extreme 
right voters was largely determined by previous pre-communist national identities as well 
as the legacy of the communist regime. Of note, a number of other legacies that Ishiyama 
included in his analysis, such as the imperial legacy, historical national identities, 
demographic and geographic legacies, appeared to have no significant influence on the 
development of political parties. One of the main implications of the study is the 
confirmation of the long-debated relationship between past and contemporary regimes, 
and specifically that more recent regime legacies have a greater influence on political 
arrangements within a state than its longer-term historical legacies.      
Overall, a growing body of literature has documented the relationship between 
democratization progress on the one hand and a country’s historical legacy on the other. 
For example, in his examination of the course of democratic transitions in the former 
Soviet Union and East Central Europe, Motyl (2004) divided the societies at focus into 
three clustered groups according to their overall level of advancement towards 
democracy. The suggested categories included countries that were classified as (a) 
market-oriented democracies, (b) dictatorships, and (c) parasitic authoritarian regimes. In 
providing the rationale for such a classification, Motyl noted that “the emergence and 
persistence of the three clusters … [are] the product of systemic forces inherited from the 
communist past” (p. 52). In emphasizing the role of historic legacies for the pace of 
democratization, he further argued that, “The degree to which the state dominated 
political, economic, cultural, and social life in a particular communist country determined 
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the ease with which non-totalitarian institutions, such as those instantiated in democracy, 
the market, rule of law, and civil society, could emerge in post-totalitarian 
circumstances” (p. 57).  
In a similar vein, Zakaria (2003) emphasized the role of historic legacies for a 
country’s democratic advancement. Specifically, he argued that societies with no or 
limited histories of democratic governance face multiple obstacles in developing effective 
democratic institutions, which may undermine democratizations efforts underway in such 
countries. More generally, in his seminal work on the role of Lenin’s rule, Jowitt (1992) 
argued that Leninist legacies, common for all former East Bloc countries in Europe, favor 
an authoritarian rather than liberal, democratic and capitalist way of life (p. 293).  
In summary, one of the most common arguments in the literature on historical 
legacies and democratic transitions is that characteristics of previous regimes appear 
important elements in understanding and predicting developments in transitioning 
societies (Dalton, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Ishiyama, 2009; Kitschelt, 1995, 1997; 
Minkenberg, 2009; Motyl, 2004). Consequently, many political theorists have relied on 
various manifestations of historical legacies in their explanations of democratic 
advancement or stagnation in such states. However, there is no agreement as to what 
features of a specific regime should be considered. Similarly, questions on how to 
differentiate between various subtypes within the same regime appear a subject of many 
scholarly debates.   
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Post-communist Legacies 
Although a substantial part of Eastern and Central European community shares a 
communist past, these historic legacies are not same (Dimitrova-Grajzl & Simon, 2010; 
Kitschelt, 1995, 1997). Many post-socialist countries that are often grouped together 
under the umbrella term socialist regime, in fact, varied substantially with regard to their 
overall level of political and social freedoms, access to the West, attitudes toward market 
reforms, and other issues (Bunce, 2004; Motyl, 2004). As Rothschild (1989) wrote, “the 
persistence and resilience of distinct and diverse political cultures within the matrix of 
common Communist institutions is quite striking” (p. 78). In addition, pre-communist 
histories of these societies are diverse, with a number of distinct characteristics in 
political, social, economic, and cultural domains. As  Barany (1995) noted with regard to 
people in post-communist societies, “The people of this region possess widely different 
cultures, traditions, histories, levels of economic development, and patterns of social 
relations” (p. 289). That is why it is important to distinguish between various regimes 
types.  
One of the most comprehensive analyses of communist regimes and their 
influence on the development of democratic institutions in post-communist societies is 
work by Kitschelt (1995, 1997). Kitschelt introduced a classification of socialist regimes 
based on the overall restrictiveness of party systems as well as on the extent of powers 
exercised by the communist party elite. More specifically, he argued that communist 
regimes varied with regard to the following three criteria: (a) the degree of “contestation” 
over political issues and beyond, (b) the extent of expressing political dissent within a 
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party, and (c) the level of bureaucratic professionalism. Based on these criteria, Kitschelt 
distinguished between three types of socialism: accommodative, patrimonial, and 
bureaucratic. Importantly, Kitschelt emphasized the importance of political arrangements 
that preceded communist regimes. He argued that pre-communist experiences had an 
influence on the communist regime, which ultimately has an impact on contemporary 
arrangements in social, political, and economic spheres.  
Although comprehensive from the political standpoint, Kitschelt’s typology has 
been criticized for its exclusion of issues that extend beyond the political arena. Thus 
Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) argued that analysis of communist regimes is not 
complete without an adequate review of economic and social aspects of the communist 
reality. Taking into consideration two additional criteria – the level of economic freedom 
and the overall restrictiveness of the regime, Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon modified 
Kitschelt’s classification to account for these differences. Borrowing Kitschelt’s labels 
for different regimes, they proposed an alternative typology that included four categories: 
(a) Accommodative communist legacy – some freedoms, some dissent, some 
access to west; medium to low overall restrictiveness; market-oriented  
(b) Bureaucratic – high level of bureaucratic institutionalization, little political 
freedom, medium to high restrictiveness;  
(c) Patrimonial – low levels of bureaucratic professionalism, no political or 
economic freedoms, no access to the West, high restrictiveness and isolation; 
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(d) Yugoslav – self-management, free movement to the West, desire for 
independence from USSR ideology and its political influence, intermediate 
levels of contestation, and some dissent.  
Connecting Historical Legacies to Democratic Citizen Orientation  
Comparative research of trajectory of democratic states has shown that historical 
legacies appear important components in explaining country’s political, social, and 
economic outcomes (Motyl, 2004; Tilly, 2006; Wittenberg, 2010). However, the link 
between a country’s communist legacy and current or future democratic orientation of its 
population is a subject of many scholarly debates. There is little systematic research on 
how different population cohorts are affected by historical legacies. Even less is known 
about the role of various legacies on shaping democratic orientation of ordinary citizens, 
including younger citizens with no direct experience of living under communist regime. 
Rose (2009) denoted the state of the literature on historical legacies and individual’s 
values and beliefs in the following way, “Although devoid of generalizability, 
ethnographic studies serve as a reminder that attitudes and habits formed in the old 
regime can and do persist” (p. 200).  
In speculating about implications of the communist past, Barany (1995) pointed 
out, “Although the Communist political institutions have been discarded with remarkable 
ease in the majority of East European states, the legacy that appears to be the most 
difficult to overcome is attitudinal rather than institutional or structural” (p. 291). He 
further noted that political apathy of the population in post-communist societies coupled 
with low levels of political sophistication and general withdrawal from politics has 
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created a backward political culture in the whole region. As Bermeo (1994) noted in this 
regard, “communism left behind a distrustful, nondemocratic civil society” (p. 160). In a 
similar vein, Konrad (cited in Barany (1995) wrote, “What will remain of socialism? All 
these socialist realist people. They are socialists because they have lived with the socialist 
reality for forty years; the majority for most of their lives. The lessons, traits, style, 
morality, and logic of these forty years cannot be dropped in the waste basket” (p. 177). 
In acknowledging the persistence of historic legacies, Rose (2009) noted that “the 
experience of being socialized into a totalitarian regime could last a lifetime” (p. 19).  
Although few empirical studies have evaluated the above-stated claims, there is 
growing evidence that historical legacies have far-ranging consequences on various 
aspects of institutional and personal well-being. For example, Dimitrova-Grajzl and 
Simon (2010) studied how the legacy of past regimes affected the level of political and 
interpersonal trust among young people in post-communist societies and in established 
democracies. Specifically, they examined how different types of communist regimes 
affected the degree to which young people in transitioning states placed trust in political 
institutions and in other people. The study tested the main proposition that more 
restrictive regimes will have a negative impact on trust displayed by young people in 
respective societies in comparison with regimes that allowed for some freedoms. Four 
types of communist legacies were included in the analyses (a) accommodative, (b) 
bureaucratic, (c) patrimonial, and (d) Yugoslav legacy. An important premise of their 
study is a consideration of trust as a “slow-moving institution” that is rooted in cultural 
norms and societal values that are transmitted from generation to generation.  
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In general, results supported the hypothesized relationship by showing that the 
legacy of socialist regime in all transitioning states led to lower trust in political 
institutions in comparison with states with no experience of socialist regime. In addition, 
the study partially supported the hypothesis that different types of socialist regimes 
affected trust to varying degrees. Thus respondents from states with legacies of 
patrimonial socialism had lower trust than respondents from accommodative socialism 
regimes. Interestingly, former Yugoslavian regimes were documented to have a larger 
negative effect on trust in comparison with other types of socialist regime. However, 
other varieties of socialism were not significantly different from each other in their 
influence on trust among younger populations. In sum, the study revealed that young 
people from former patrimonial socialist regimes displayed the lowest levels of trust, 
followed by people in former bureaucratic regimes. Young adults from states with the 
legacy of accommodative socialist regime had the highest level of trust among all other 
states but lower than their counterparts from Western democracies. Overall, the study 
documented heterogeneous impact of socialism on trust among people from post-
communist societies and reiterated the importance of including historical legacies in 
analyses of democratically relevant attitudes. Moreover, the study further confirmed the 
significance of differentiating between different regime types.       
To sum, although voluminous literature described the role of historic legacies on 
socio-political developments within a society or across regions, less commonly examined 
are the effects of different legacies on citizens’ values and beliefs, especially among 
younger generations. In the context of post-communist states, information is especially 
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scarce about the impact of historical legacies on young people who grew up without a 
direct experience of the communist regime (for exceptions see Dimitrova-Grajzl & 
Simon, 2010).  
Democratic Institutions and Democratic Citizen Orientation  
An alternative approach to analyzing factors influencing democratic citizen 
orientation deals with more immediate conditions of democratic infrastructure rather than 
deeply-rooted cultural norms or historical memory. According to the supporters of this 
approach, institutional characteristics of contemporary democratic institutions can 
promote or impede public endorsement of democratic orientation (for example, Anderson 
& Guillory, 2003; Norris, 1999). A general assumption of institutional theories of 
democratic support is that public perception of the effectiveness of democratic 
functioning is key to favorable opinions about democracy (Mishler & Rose, 2001). In 
other words, the sources of favorable opinions on issues relevant to democracy are found 
within democratic performance itself, rather than in outside forces.   
The overarching question guiding research on institutional determinants of public 
support for democratic principles can be phrased in the following way: Which 
institutional characteristics can impact the way individuals view democratic principles 
and ideas?  Different scholars provided different explanations to this question. For 
example, Inglehart (1997) linked favorable economic conditions with better democratic 
functioning and higher support for democratic values. Norris (1999) used Freedom House 
rating scores to show that trust, an important component of democratic citizen 
orientation, is higher in states with better records of respect of political rights and 
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liberties than in states that score lower on measures of respect of political rights and 
liberties. Similarly, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) documented a negative correlation 
between the level of corruption in society and citizens’ trust. This finding suggests that 
public endorsement of specific elements of democratic citizen orientation influences and 
is being influenced by individuals’ perceptions of the fairness of relevant societal 
institutions.      
At the same time, despite the fact that support for democracy appears at the core 
of political science research, studies investigating the relationship between citizens’ 
support for democracy in a broad sense and democratic functioning are relatively new. 
For many years, noticeably absent from the majority of theoretical inquiries and practical 
interventions has been reliable evidence on what people actually think about different 
aspects of democratic society and how such views vary across generations and across 
different regions of the world (Mattes, 2010). Especially scarce such information is with 
regard to states that are moving toward democratic consolidation. In concluding remarks 
to his presentation “How People View Democracy: Findings from Public Opinion 
Surveys in Four Regions,” Diamond (2001) noted, “despite the extraordinary outporing 
of data over the past decade, the comparative study of how mass publics in emerging 
democracies view and value their institutions is only now emerging into a more mature 
phase” (p. 19).  
In sum, according to institutional approaches, individuals display varying levels 
of endorsement of democratic orientation based on the context in which democratic 
institutions function. The specifics and direction of such institutional effects are not clear, 
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however. Thus, no consensus has been established in terms of concrete features of 
institutional design that might foster democratic citizen orientation. Moreover, no 
research has established causal relationship between democratic functioning and 
democratic citizen orientation. That is, it is not yet known whether favorable democratic 
functioning causes people to value democracy and its principles or whether people’s 
appreciation of a democratic way of life leads to democratic advancement.  
Summary 
Summarizing findings from selected studies reviewed in the sections above, it can 
be stated that a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches have established the 
importance of studying democratically relevant attitudes and behaviors and advanced our 
understanding of how these phenomena might contribute to democracy promotion and 
consolidation. In general, research on democratic citizen orientation has focused on 
several core areas: (a) different aspects of democratic orientations and how to measure 
them, (b) implications of democratically-oriented citizenry for a country’s political, 
social, and economic development, (c) comparisons of behavior patterns between pro-
democratically oriented citizens and those who are less democratically inclined, and (d) 
historical and institutional influences on democratic citizen orientation. While some areas 
have received considerable attention from scholars interested in democratic orientation, 
other areas have been understudied. For example, a great deal of research on democratic 
focuses on the relationship between democratic functioning and support for democratic 
governance or seeks to understand how various country characteristics, such as political 
regimes or economic prosperity, influence democratic attitudes. At the same time, very 
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little systematic research has examined the relationship between democratic orientation 
and democracy at the societal level (exceptions, see Inglehart, 2003; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2006) 
In addition, the literature on adherence to democratic principles and norms lacks a 
comprehensive examination of cross-cultural variation in democratic orientations among 
youth. Many theoretical inquires that have shaped a significant amount of research 
dedicated to the study of transitioning societies have primarily been tested among adult 
populations in emerging democracies. However, few studies have examined relevant 
attitudes, values, and beliefs among younger populations in transitioning societies. Even 
less common are comparative analyses of such attitudes among youths from societies in 
different stages of democratic transformation.  
Thus, the identified gaps in the literature raise the following questions: What 
factors best describe adolescents’ democratic orientation? How do these factors relate to 
adolescents’ countries of origin?  How are democratic orientations distributed among 
adolescents in emerging and established democracies? How can we explain the 
differences found across and within countries? And, finally, does adolescents’ democratic 
orientation matter for a country’s long-term democratic outlook? These are the main 
questions guiding this dissertation. The Chapter that follows outlines the specific research 
questions and anticipated hypotheses and describes the data and the methodology that are 
used to address these inquiries.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
DATA AND METHODS 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Although there are many expectations and predictions made in regard to aspiring 
and established democracies, there is a lack of research to guide practical interventions 
that might foster democratic development (Dalton, 2004; Print, 2007; Putnam, 2000; 
Sloam, 2007; Stewart, 2009a, 2009b; Tessler & Gao, 2009). Additionally, many gaps 
remain in the literature on the nature of democratic orientation among the general public. 
For example, some important aspects of democratic citizen orientation, including 
developmental and cultural determinants of pro-democratic attitudes, have been neglected 
(Mattes, 2010). Consensus is also yet to be established on the relationship between 
historical factors and the degree to which populations endorse democratic values and the 
degree to which institutional characteristics influence democratic beliefs (Mishler & 
Rose, 2001, 2005). Finally, there is a lack of research on democratic attitudes and public 
support for democratic values beyond those that explicitly mention the most basic 
elements of a democratic system (Inglehart, 2003). Especially scarce is information about 
democratic orientations among younger generations.  
The present dissertation addresses these gaps by providing information on the 
democratic orientations of adolescents from states with varying economic, political, and 
social situations. The main goal of this dissertation is to describe and analyze democratic 
orientations among adolescents from aspiring and established democracies. Specifically, 
the dissertation compares how adolescents’ democratic attitudes differ based on the 
70 
 
historical legacies of the countries in which they reside and based on the quality of 
democratic institutions within their countries.  
This research was conducted in two stages. In the first stage a number of analyses 
were carried out to prepare the dataset for statistical tests. Specifically, questions related 
to the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation as well as reliability of 
derived measures were explored.  
The main research questions were addressed in the second stage. To organize 
statistical analyses and help with the interpretation of findings, research questions and 
hypotheses were subdivided into three sections. Section one describes how adolescents in 
aspiring and established democracies differ in terms of their democratic worldview. 
Section two examines the impact of historical legacies and the quality of contemporary 
democratic institutions on each of the identified factors of adolescents’ democratic 
orientation. Finally, section three explores the relationship between adolescents’ 
democratic orientation and their intentions to participate in social and political activities 
upon reaching adulthood.  
Stage I: Dataset Preparation  
Research Questions: 
1. Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of ICCS data reliable 
tools for assessing democratic orientations among adolescents from selected 
countries?   
2. What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
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Stage II: Hypotheses Testing  
Section 1: Describing differences in adolescents’ democratic orientations 
Research Question 1:  
How do democratic orientations compare among adolescents from different 
countries? 
Hypothesis 1:   
There are significant differences in democratic orientations among adolescents 
from different countries.  
Research Question 2:  
Are there significant differences in democratic orientations between adolescents 
in aspiring and established democracies?  
Hypothesis 2:   
There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and established 
democracies in terms of their democratic orientations. 
Section 2: Examining variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations  
Research Question 1: 
What is the relationship between a country’s history of democratic tradition and 
adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
Hypothesis 1:  
There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of 
democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientation.  
Research Question 2: 
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What is the relationship between a country’s history of communism and 
adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
Hypothesis 2:  
There is a significant negative relationship between a country’s history of 
communism and adolescents’ democratic orientations.  
Research Question 3: 
To what extent are there significant differences in adolescents’ democratic 
orientation related to historical legacy?  
Hypothesis 3: 
Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientation differently.  
Hypothesis 3a: 
Adolescents in states with a Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower levels 
of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a Bureaucratic or an 
Accommodative communist legacies. 
Hypothesis 3b: 
Adolescents in states with a Bureaucratic communist legacy will have lower 
levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with an 
Accommodative communist legacy. 
Hypothesis 3c: 
Adolescents in states with an Accommodative communist legacy will have lower 
levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a legacy of 
democratic tradition.  
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Research Question 4: 
What is the relationship between adolescents’ democratic orientation and the 
quality of democratic institutions in their societies? 
Hypothesis 4: 
There is a positive relationship between the quality of democratic institutions and 
adolescents’ democratic orientation. 
Research Question 5: 
Is historical legacy or the quality of current democratic institutions more 
important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
Hypothesis 5:   
Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic 
orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions of their countries.   
Section 3: Exploring the potential consequences of democratic orientations 
Research Question 1: 
To what extent does each dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation 
predict their intentions to participate in future social and political activities?  
Hypothesis 1:  
The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the higher their 
intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.    
Bonus Research 
Bonus Research Question: Can adolescents be classified into distinct groups based on 
their democratic orientation?  
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Hypothesis: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based on their democratic 
orientation.  
Data Sources 
To answer research questions and test the posed hypotheses, data at different 
levels are needed. Specifically, exploring the nature of democratic orientation among 
adolescents requires individual-level data on values, beliefs, and behavioral intentions. 
The main data source was the International Civic and Citizenship Study (2009). In turn, 
assessing country-level correlates of adolescents’ democratic orientations requires 
aggregate measures of historical legacies and measures of the quality of democratic 
institutions. The Quality of Democracy Index, a measure of the Quality of Democracy 
project was used to measure the quality of democratic institutions. To measure historical 
legacy, a modified version of Kitschelt’s (1995) typology of communist regimes was 
used.  
Background on the IEA Civic Education Studies 
Established in 1958 as a consortium of educational and social science research 
institutes, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement 
(IEA) has been conducting studies of civic knowledge among adolescents from different 
countries since the early 1970s. The first study took place in 1971 and tested about 
32,000 students from nine countries. The second wave of the study, known as the IEA 
Civic Education Study (CIVED), was initiated in the late 1990s and expanded its pool of 
international participants to include 90,000 students from 28 countries in different regions 
of the world. The International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS) presents 
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the third wave of a large-scale IEA initiative and is the largest international study to date 
to explore civic knowledge and attitudes of secondary school students in an international 
setting. Conducted in 2009, the ICCS gathered data from more than 140,000 adolescents 
in over 5,300 schools from 38 states in Europe, Asia, South America, and other parts of 
the world. The ICCS 2009 target population was students in the eighth grade or an 
equivalent grade that represents eight years of schooling. The average age of students in 
the 8
th
 grade or equivalent was 13.5 years. Original datasets contained data for over 3000 
students selected at random in approximately 150 schools in each country (Schulz, 
Fraillon, Ainley, & Van de Gaer, 2011). 
Rigorous design of these multi-phase research initiatives and availability of data 
comparable across cultures and, in some, cases, between different points of time, has 
attracted much scholarly interest. Researchers from a variety of academic disciplines, 
including civic education scholars, political scientists, psychologists, and country 
specialists have analyzed IEA data from civic education studies (for example, Amadeo, 
Torney-Purta, Lehman, Husfeldt, & Nikolova, 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz & 
Sibberns, 2004; Schulz, Ainley, Fraillon, Kerr, & Losito, 2010).  
This dissertation utilizes data from the most recent study, conducted in 2009. The 
ICCS International Database offers researchers and analysts a rich environment for 
examining student achievement in civic knowledge across nations. Rooted in the 
concepts of ecological theory of human developments, the ICCS is provides a coherent 
framework for analyzing adolescents’ civic knowledge and covers a wide range of topics 
relevant for the study of democratic attitudes. The dataset contains data that are 
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segregated into separate parts, according to each of the many aspects of democratic 
political culture – from tolerance toward outside groups and gender equality attitudes to 
participatory aspirations and trust in governmental institutions.  
The main goal of the 2009 ICCS parallels those of the previous waves and aims to 
examine young people’s attitudes and beliefs about society as well as their expectations 
for undertaking citizenship roles and responsibilities in the future. In general, six broad 
research themes are studied: (a) variations in civic knowledge across cultures; (b) 
changes in civic knowledge since 1999; (c) students’ interest in engaging in public and 
political life and their disposition to do so; (d) perceptions of threats to democracy and 
civil society; (e) features of education systems, schools, and classrooms related to civic 
and citizenship education; and (f) aspects of students’ backgrounds related to the 
outcomes of civic and citizenship education. 
Although ICCS builds on previous IEA studies of civic knowledge, there are a 
number of unique features that were introduced for the first time during this third wave. 
One such feature is the inclusion of regional modules in the design of questionnaires and 
other research instruments. Thus three regional modules - Asian, European, and Latin 
American, were developed to assess specific regional characteristics in the spheres of 
civic and citizenship education in 38 countries.  
The ICCS design is structured around three main dimensions (a) content 
dimension that details the subject matter within civics and citizenship domain, (b) 
affective-behavioral dimension that measures students’ perceptions and activities, and (c) 
cognitive dimension that describes the thinking process (Schulz, Fraillon, Ainley, Losito, 
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& Kerr, 2008). Each dimension is further subdivided into smaller sub-domains, that in 
turn consist of one or more aspects. This dissertation focuses on the affective-behavioral 
dimension consisting of value beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behaviors 
within the context of civics and citizenship. The rationale for focusing on the selected 
attitudes is their conceptual relevance to the study of democratic values and beliefs.    
The ICCS study utilized a randomized trial design that included not only 
adolescents but also teachers and school principles. A variety of methods were used to 
collect data, including a self-reported questionnaire with multiple choice items, right and 
wrong answers, and attitudinal scaled questions without right or wrong answers. Two 
types of instruments were developed to gather information from participating students. 
One is a student test that measures civic and citizenship knowledge and understanding of 
basic concepts. The other instrument represents a questionnaire that assesses students’ 
perceptions of ideas, constructs, and behaviors relevant to the civic and citizenship 
domains.  
Theoretical Framework 
A sophisticated theoretical model has been developed to organize, analyze, and 
explain information collected for the study (Amadeo et al., 2002; Torney-Purta et al., 
2001). ICCS theoretical  framework builds on the CIVED conceptual model and reflects 
its major principles. In more detail, the model is based on theories of ecological 
development (Bronfenbrenner, 1988) and situated cognition (Lave & Wenger, 1997). By 
merging these two theories, the model represents “a visualization of ways in which the 
everyday lives of young people in homes, with peers, and at school serve as a ‘nested’ 
78 
 
context for young people’s thinking and action n the social and political environment.” 
(Amadeo et al., 2002, p. 21). In addition, separate elements from political socialization 
theories (Flanagan & Sherrod, 1998) and research on democracy (Dalton, 2000) along 
with relevant theoretical insights from a variety of other disciplines have been integrated 
into the model as well. As a result, the IEA comprehensive theoretical framework 
virtually presents a model of a civic world where every individual student occupies a 
central position and acts as both initiator and recipient of multiple actions within this 
world (Torney-Purta et al., 2001; Schulz et al., 2008). Central to this framework is the 
assumption that youths learn about civics and citizenship in multiple contexts outside 
school and classroom instruction, such as through their interactions with civic players at 
different levels.   
Three broad domains were selected to guide the research project. They included 
democracy, national identity, regional and international relationships, and social cohesion 
and diversity. Additionally, a domain related to economics and media and environment 
was introduced to test democratic knowledge and civic attitudes among upper secondary 
students (Amadeo et al., 2002). Each of the domains contained a number of sub-domains 
for a more complete assessment of variables of interest.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model of the ICCS and CIVED Studies 
   
 
Source: International Civic and Citizenship Education Study: Assessment framework (Schulz et al., 2008). 
Dataset Development 
As described above, the International Civic and Citizenship Study is the largest 
international study to date that contains information about adolescents’ citizenship 
knowledge and civic values, including democratic orientation (Schulz et al., 2010). 
Specifically, the ICCS student questionnaire provides individual-level data relevant to 
adolescents’ democratic orientation, such as tolerance of outgroups, support for 
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democratic values and freedoms, adolescents’ trust in governmental authorities and 
others people, and other attitudinal measures.  
Although datasets are available for 38 countries, this dissertation limits the 
analysis to 20 states that represent established and aspiring democracies. Specifically, this 
dissertation focuses on the European module that consists of 24 countries (Kerr, Sturman, 
Schulz, & Burge, 2010). The majority of the countries included in the analyses are 
European states and members of the European Union with the exception of Norway, 
Russia, and Switzerland. In addition to varying degrees of democratic advancement, a 
number of indicators at social, political, cultural, and other levels distinguish these 
countries and thus provide a rich context for comparing them. Theoretical and practical 
reasons guided the selection of countries. The practical considerations included 
availability of data at the country level that would enable meaningful comparisons 
between different states. The theoretical considerations included regional variations and 
system-level characteristics in the socio-political sphere that allow cross-national 
comparisons. Additionally, a variety of measures used to assess the state of democracy in 
regions across the world utilize a similar approach to classifying countries.  
To make the dataset more manageable, sample reduction analysis was carried out. 
Specifically, 33% of all cases were randomly selected in each country and the reduced 
samples were then pooled together into a single dataset resulting in 21,672 cases to be 
analyzed.  
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The ICCS Research Variables 
The student portion of the ICCS consists of a test of 80 items that assess civic 
knowledge and a 121-item student questionnaire that focuses on adolescents’ attitudes 
and values in the spheres of citizenship and civic engagement (Schulz et al., 2010). In 
more detail, the ICCS student questionnaire consists of a collection of background, civic 
knowledge, and attitudinal questions that provide insights into adolescents’ worldview on 
issues related to democracy and civil society. As part of the initial analysis of the ICCS 
data, several scales were constructed to help assess students’ attitudes in the spheres 
outlined above. Altogether, 19 scales were developed to assess students’ attitudes in the 
four domains (a) value beliefs, (b) attitudes, (c) behaviors, and d) behavioral intentions. 
All scales were constructed with the help of confirmatory factor analysis and item 
response theory (IRT) methods. The original scales had a mean of 50 and standard 
deviation of 10.  
This research utilizes selected attitudinal scaled items that have the most 
relevance to research questions prompted by the literature review. In addition, a few 
background variables are utilized to supplement the information obtained from scales. 
This section describes in detail the variables utilized in this research. Specifically, the 
following ICCS variables are described: demographic variables, support for democratic 
values, gender equality attitudes, tolerance towards outgroups, participatory orientation, 
trust attitudes, attitudes towards one’s country, internal political efficacy, and interest in 
social and political issues. In addition, Appendix A provides details about the specific 
wording of each instrument.  
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Demographic Variables  
A number of ICCS questions in the students’ test gathered socio-demographic 
information about adolescents. Despite a large number of background variables available 
for analysis, this study limits demographic characteristics to two specific measures - 
gender and socioeconomic status. Gender presents a dichotomous variable, with 0 
representing male respondents and 1 denoting female respondents. Students’ 
socioeconomic background was assessed using the reported number of books in the 
home. Specifically, the item measuring the variable of interest was phrased in the 
following way: “About how many books are there in your home?” (There are usually 
about 40 books per metre of shelving. Do not count magazines, newspapers, comic strips 
or your schoolbooks.) The answer options included six categories, ranging from 0 to ten 
books to more than 500 books. Previous analyses of other IEA studies have utilized this 
variable as a measure of socioeconomic status and have consistently found it to be a valid 
indicator of family background (Richardson, 2003; Torney-Purta et al., 2001).  
Support for Democratic Values 
Unlike other democracy-related concepts reviewed in the sections above, support 
for democratic values is directly linked to democratic citizen orientation and thus appears 
especially pertinent in the study of adolescents’ democratic orientation. Data from the 
ICCS contain a number of individual items and scaled measures of students’ attitudes 
toward democratic values and principles. Specifically, the student questionnaire 
contained nine questions that measured student beliefs about democracy. Items 
represented a series of statements about what a democratic society should be like.  
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In this research, support for democratic values was assessed using a scaled 
measure of five items. Some statements included in the scale were phrased in the 
following way: “Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely”; 
“All people should have their social and political rights respected”; “All citizens should 
have the rights to elect their leaders freely,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete 
list of questions). Students were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each 
of the items using a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 denoted strong agreement and 4 
indicated strong disagreement. Higher scores on the scale reflect greater endorsement of 
basic democratic values. The scale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency both in 
relation to individual countries and with regard to the average international sample. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the international ICCS sample was 0.65 and ranged 
from 0.56 to 0.78 for individual countries.  
Gender Equality Attitudes  
A portion of the ICCS assessment framework focused on equal rights attitudes, 
including gender equality beliefs. Seven questions about the role of men and women in 
society and their rights were included in the questionnaire. Sample issues included the 
following phrases: “Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same 
jobs”; “Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government”; 
“Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women,” and others (see Appendix 
A for a complete list of questions). Students rated their agreement with each of the 
statements on a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement and 4 
strong disagreement.     
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Confirmatory factor analysis revealed a one factor solution with six items grouped 
together into a scale of adolescents’ support for equal gender rights and responsibilities. 
The scale demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha .79) for the ICCS 
pooled international sample. ICCS country reliability coefficients ranged from .67 in 
Russia to .87 in Finland. Higher scores on the scale indicate greater endorsement of 
gender equality rights.    
Tolerance toward Outgroups  
Two separate scales measured adolescents’ attitudes toward minority groups (a) 
tolerance toward immigrants, and (b) tolerance toward ethnic groups. Both are described 
in detail in the sections below.  
Tolerance toward immigrants. Five statements about immigrants were used to 
construct a scale assessing adolescents’ attitudes towards this group. Sample items in this 
scale included the following: “Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue 
speaking their own language”; “Immigrant children should have the same opportunities 
for education that other children in the country have”; “Immigrants should have all the 
same rights that everyone else in the country has,” and others (see Appendix A for a 
complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate the degree to which they agree 
with each of the statement on a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong 
agreement and 4 strong disagreement. Reliability statistics of the instrument showed it 
was a reliable measure of adolescents attitudes toward immigrants, with reliability 
coefficients ranging from .89 to .50 in individual countries. Cronbach’s alpha for the 
ICCS pooled international sample was .80.        
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Tolerance toward ethnic groups. Another measure of adolescents’ attitudes 
toward minority groups dealt with students’ views on the rights and opportunities 
available for ethnic and racial groups in their societies. Sample statements developed for 
this purpose included: “All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get a 
good education in <country of test>”; “Schools should teach students to respect members 
of all ethnic/ racial groups,” and others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). 
Students rated their agreement with each of the five statements, further used for the scale 
construction, using a 4-point Likert-type. The instrument demonstrated high internal 
consistency for the ICCS international pooled sample and individual countries, with alpha 
coefficients of .83 and up to .91, respectively.   
Participatory Orientation 
The ICCS study included 12 items that were designed to measure adolescents’ 
opinions about importance of different forms of citizen participation. Results of initial 
confirmatory factor analyses suggested a two-factor structure of students perceptions of 
citizen participation. Thus two scales were developed to assess these perceptions (a) 
support for conventional citizenship participation, and (b) support for social movement 
citizen participation.     
Support for conventional citizen participation. This scale consists of six items 
that include statements about different kinds of conventional citizen participation. 
Students were asked to indicate their perceptions of importance of each form of 
participation/ behaviors using a 4-point Likert-type scale, where 1 stood for “very 
important” and “4” denoted “not important at all.” The question was phrased in the 
86 
 
following way: “How important are the following behaviors for being a good adult 
citizen?” Sample behaviors ranged from following political news and engaging in 
political discussions to voting in national elections and joining a political party. The scale 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of .71 for the 
ICCS pooled international sample and up to .77 for individual states.  
Support for social movement citizen participation. Questions that measured 
adolescents’ appreciation for social movement citizen participation dealt with less 
traditional forms of citizen involvement, such as participating in activities that focus on 
benefiting local communities, protecting environment, or promoting human rights (see 
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Altogether, four items were included in the 
scale. The scale appeared a reliable measure for the ICCS international sample 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .74). Reliability coefficients for individual countries ranged from .51 
to .81.  
Trust Attitudes  
As part of assessing adolescents’ civic value beliefs and attitudes pertaining to the 
affective-behavioral domain, the ICCS included the measurement of trust in political and 
civic institutions. The student questionnaire contained a number of items used to assess 
students’ confidence in civic and political institutions in their country. These items 
consisted of a series of questions about various institutions in a country of test, such as 
courts, the national government, political parties, police, and others. Students were asked 
to indicate the degree to which they trust each of these institutions. A Likert-type 
responses with four categories were used to get this information. Responses ranged from 
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1 –completely trust to 4 – not at all trust. Out of 14 items available for analysis, six 
questions were scaled to assess students’ trust in governmental and related institutions. 
The scale demonstrated high internal consistency for the ICCS pooled international 
sample, with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82. Reliability coefficients for individual countries 
ranged from 0.78 in Latvia to 0.89 in Sweden.  
Similar to other scaled measures, the Rasch Partial Credit Model was used for 
creating a scale of trust in civic institutions. As a result, a scale with a mean of 50 and a 
standard deviation of 10 was developed for all equally weighted ICCS national samples 
(Brese, Jung, Mirazchiyski, Schulz, & Zuehlke, 2011). The higher values on this scale 
denote greater levels of trust placed in civic and political institutions. It is important to 
note that although scale scores could be interpreted in terms of comparing individual or 
group scores with each other or with the ICCS average, the individual scores do not 
reveal any information about the item responses per se. Thus, it is impossible to use the 
obtained score for evaluating the extent to which respondents endorsed each particular 
item that comprised the scale.   
Attitudes towards One’s Country  
The ICCS instrument contained a series of items to explore how students feel 
about their countries. Out of eight items originally developed to measure students’ 
attitudes towards their countries, seven were used to form a scale. The scale contained 
statements about students’ pride in the past and present achievement of their countries, 
respect towards state symbols, and perceived effectiveness of state institutions (see 
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students’ rated their agreement with each 
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of the statement using a four-point Likert-type scale, where 1 indicated strong agreement 
and 4 denoted strong disagreement. The psychometric information obtained for this scale 
showed that it was a reliable tool for analyzing student data from both the ICCS 
international pooled sample and individual states, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients 
of .82 and up to .88, respectively.        
Internal Political Efficacy  
Assessment of adolescents’ internal political efficacy was made using a 6-item 
scale. Sample items for this scale included the following phrases: “I know more about 
politics than most people of my age”; “I am able to understand political issues easily”; 
“When political issues or problems are discussed, I usually have something to say,” and 
others (see Appendix A for a complete list of questions). Students were asked to rate their 
agreement with each statement on a four-point Likert-type scale as described above. 
Higher scores indicate that students feel that they are knowledgeable about politics and 
that they have rather high internal political efficacy. On the other hand, lower scores 
indicate generally low or no interest in politics and that students do not feel that they 
know more about political issues than their peers. This scale demonstrated high internal 
consistency, with Cronbach’s  alpha coefficients of .84 for the ICCS international sample 
and up to .89 for individual states. Analysis of individual countries also demonstrated 
good model fit and satisfactory factor loadings for the scale.    
Interest in Social and Political Issues 
Out of seven items developed to measure adolescents’ interest in social and 
political issues, national and international in scope, five were used to construct a scale of 
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such attitudes. All items had a common beginning and started in the following way: 
“How interested are you in the following issues?” Students were presented with a series 
of issues, such as political and social issues in the country of test and political issues in 
other countries, and indicated their level of interest in each of the issues on a 4-point 
Likert-type scale, where 1 denoted “very interested” and 4 “not interested at all” (see 
Appendix A for a complete list of questions). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of this 
scale was .86 for the ICCS international sample and ranged from .75 to .92 for different 
countries.  
The Quality of Democracy Index 
In investigating the course of democratic developments and, most importantly, 
people’s responses to democratization processes, understanding the nature and 
characteristics of each democratic system is critical. Although most societies in this 
research formally fall under the category of democratic states, assessing the state of 
democracy in these countries requires information not only about the presence of 
democratic institutions but also about the character and quality of democratic institutions.     
As the literature review demonstrated, there are many measurements of 
democracy and democratic attitudes but no consensus has been achieved in terms of the 
best indicator of a country’s democratic development. This research utilizes the 
Democracy Ranking of the Quality of Democracy that evaluates countries’ democratic 
progress based on the quality of their democracy. First introduced by Campbell (2008), 
the Quality of Democracy index emphasizes the importance of measuring democracy 
within the context of society and integrates a number of societal characteristics in its 
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assessment framework. Specifically, six dimensions are included in the index: (a) 
political system, (b) gender, (c) economy, (d) knowledge, (e) health, and (f) the 
environment. Each of the dimensions is assigned a score and a weight measure and then 
aggregated into an average score. Of note, the political dimension accounts for 50% of 
the total score. Thus the Democracy Ranking presents a multidimensional measure that 
focuses not only on the performance of democratic institutions in the political system but 
also on the performance of non-political dimensions that represent different domains of 
society. By applying such a comprehensive framework, the Democracy Ranking adopts a 
broad definition of democracy. The conceptual framework for this is expressed in the 
following formula:  
Quality of Democracy = (freedom and other characteristics of the political 
system) + (performance of non-political dimensions)
13
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
According to Campbell (2008), the rationale for adopting such a broad framework is that takes into 
different domains of people’s lives that are not typically included in traditional measures of democracy. In 
Campbell’s own words: Without reflecting on the quality of society, there cannot be a sufficient 
comprehension of the context for the quality of politics. And the quality of society clearly colors the quality 
of the life of individuals and of communities within that society” (p. 35).  
.  
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Figure 2: The Quality of Democratic Institutions by Country  
 
Historical Legacies Categories 
To measure historical legacy, two categorical groupings have been adopted: 
aspiring democracies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Russia) and established democracies (Austria, Belgium 
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland). This simplified classification mainly aims to distinguish between 
democratic orientations of adolescents in aspiring and established democracies. Of note, a 
number of measures that assess the state of democracy in regions across the world utilize 
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a similar approach to classifying countries (for example, Freedom in the World analytical 
reports compiled by Freedom House).   
The categorical groupings of countries into established and aspiring democracies 
are further subdivided into four legacy types based on the nature of the previous 
communist regime. Countries are placed in the following types of historical legacy: (a) 
accommodative, (b) bureaucratic, (c) patrimonial, and (d) democratic tradition. Table 1 
summarizes these categories. The categories were adopted based on Dimitrova-Grajzl 
and Simon’s (2010) classification of communist legacies. This study utilizes this 
classification to measure democratic orientation rather than other suggested typologies of 
communist legacies due to the following reasons. First, it accounts for political structures 
of the past plus some aspects of social and economic reality during the communist period. 
Secondly, it assumes that national conditions varied not only during the communist 
regime but also prior to its establishment. Thus it also takes into account pre-communist 
legacies. This classification was discussed in more detailed in the Literature Review in 
the section on Post-communist Legacies.  
Table 1: Classification of Historical Legacies  
Legacy type  Countries   
Accommodative communist legacy Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, Poland 
Bureaucratic communist legacy Czech Republic, Slovak Republic 
Patrimonial communist legacy Bulgaria, Russia 
Democratic tradition Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Belgium 
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Methods of Analysis 
This research was based on quantitative analysis of secondary data from sources 
described in detail above. Two analytical programs were used to perform statistical 
procedures - the 18
th
 version of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for 
Windows and an add-on module for SPSS Analysis of Moment Structures (AMOS). The 
data analyses were carried out in two stages: (a) dataset preparation and (b) hypothesis 
testing. In the first stage, reliability and principal component analyses (PCA) were 
conducted for the purpose of establishing psychometric properties of the variables and to 
identify underlying dimensions, or components, in adolescents’ democratic orientation. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out to confirm that the identified model 
presents a good fit for data from selected ICCS countries.  
The second stage included descriptive statistics that provided descriptions of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation and a number of inferential statistical analyses, such 
as correlation analyses, t-tests, analyses of variance (ANOVA), and hierarchical 
regressions that addressed the main research questions. Table 2 summarizes research 
questions, hypotheses, and the statistical analyses that were used in this research.   
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Table 2: Research Questions and Statistical Analyses    
  
Stage, 
Section 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 
Statistical 
Analyses 
Research Variables 
Stage I RQ1: Are the scales that were developed for the primary 
analysis of ICCS data reliable tools for assessing democratic 
orientations of adolescents from selected countries?  
 
RQ2: What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic 
orientation? 
 
Is the model that proposes a three-component structure of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation a good fit for data from 
selected ICCS countries?   
Reliability 
analysis 
 
 
 
 
Principal 
component 
analysis 
 
Confirmatory 
factor analysis  
 
Support for democratic values 
Gender equality attitudes 
Equal rights for ethnic minorities 
Equal rights for immigrants 
Conventional citizenship 
Social movement citizenship 
Interest in politics and social 
issues 
Internal political efficacy 
Institutional trust 
Attitudes towards one’s country  
 
Stage II, 
Section 1 
RQ1: How do adolescents’ democratic orientations compare 
among different countries? 
            
H1: There are significant differences in democratic 
orientations among adolescents from different countries.  
Descriptive 
statistics 
 
 
 
ANOVA 
  
 
RQ2: Are there differences in democratic orientations 
between adolescents in aspiring and established 
democracies?  
 
H2: There are significant differences among adolescents 
from aspiring and established democracies in terms of their 
democratic orientations. 
T-test, 
Descriptive 
statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variables: 
- Civil liberties 
- Engagement 
- Trust 
Independent variable: 
Type of democratic advancement 
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Stage II, 
Section 2 
RQ1: What is the relationship between a country’s history of 
democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic 
orientation?  
H1: There is a significant positive relationship between a 
country’s history of democratic tradition and adolescents’ 
democratic orientation.  
 
RQ2: What is the relationship between a country’s history of 
communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between a country’s 
history of communism and adolescents’ democratic 
orientation.  
 
RQ3: To what extent are there significant differences in 
adolescents’ democratic attitudes related to historical 
legacy? 
 
H3: Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic 
orientation differently.  
  
H3a: Adolescents in states with Patrimonial communist 
legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than 
adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative 
communist legacies. 
 
H3b: Adolescents in states with Bureaucratic communist 
legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than 
adolescents in states with Accommodative communist 
legacy. 
 
Correlations, 
Descriptive 
statistics  
 
ANOVA   
posthoc tests 
 
Correlations, 
descriptive 
statistics 
Dependent variables: 
- Civil liberties 
- Engagement 
- Trust 
Independent variable: 
-  Type of historical legacy 
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H3c: Adolescents in states with Accommodative communist 
legacy will have lower levels of democratic orientation than 
adolescents in states with a legacy of democratic tradition. 
 RQ4:What is the relationship between adolescents’ 
democratic orientation and the current quality of democratic 
institutions in their societies? 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the current 
quality of democratic institutions and adolescents’ 
democratic orientation. 
Correlations, 
descriptive 
statistics  
Dependent variables: 
- Civil liberties 
- Engagement 
- Trust 
Independent variable: 
- Quality of democracy  
RQ5: Is historical legacy or the quality of current 
democratic institution more important in determining 
adolescents’ democratic orientations?  
 
H5: Historical legacy is more important in determining 
adolescents’ democratic orientation than the current quality 
of democratic institutions.  
MANOVA  Dependent variables: 
- Civil liberties 
- Engagement 
- Trust 
Independent variable: 
- Quality of democracy   
- Type of historical legacy  
Stage II, 
Section 3 
RQ1: To what extent does each dimension of adolescents’ 
democratic orientation predict their intentions to participate 
in future social and political activities?  
 
H1: The higher the level of democratic orientation among 
adolescents, the higher their intentions with regard to 
participation in future social and political activities.    
Hierarchical 
regressions  
Dependent variables: 
Expected participation in:  
- legal protest 
- in illegal protest  
- elections 
- formal political activities 
- informal activities  
Independent variables:  
- Civil liberties 
- Engagement 
- Trust 
Control Variables: 
- Gender 
- Home literacy resources 
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Bonus 
research   
RQ1: Can adolescents be classified into distinct groups 
based on their democratic orientation?  
 
H: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based 
on their democratic orientation.  
 
Discriminant 
function analysis  
Dependent variable: 
- Type of historical legacy 
Independent variables: 
- Support for democratic 
values 
- Gender equality attitudes 
- Equal rights for ethnic 
minorities 
- Equal rights for 
immigrants 
- Interest in politics and 
social issues 
- Internal political efficacy 
- Institutional trust 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
Stage I: Dataset Preparation  
Prior to running specific analyses to address the research questions and test the 
relationships hypothesized in this study, several transformations were made to ensure the 
dataset met the necessary criteria for carrying out statistical procedures. Specifically, the 
transformations included cleaning the data, addressing missing values issues, reviewing 
correlation coefficients, calculating reliability statistics, and developing new scales.  
The total number of observations is 21,672, drawn from 20 countries. Descriptive 
statistics and correlation matrices were generated as a basis for other statistic procedures. 
The results are presented in Appendix B.  
Reliability Statistics for the ICCS Scales 
Research Question 1: Are the scales that were developed for the primary analysis of 
ICCS data reliable tools for assessing democratic orientations among adolescents 
from selected countries?   
Because this study utilized data from selected countries and because only a 
portion of all available cases were randomly chosen to create a single dataset, a series of 
reliability analyses were conducted to ensure that the scales that were originally 
developed for the analysis of ICCS data also provide accurate measures of the concepts 
of interest. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were calculated for 10 scales for the pooled 
sample and for individual countries. Results from the pooled sample are summarized in 
Table 3 below.  
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Table 3: Descriptive and Reliability Statistics for Research Variables 
Research variable  Number of 
items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
(pooled sample) 
Support for democratic values 5 .66 
Gender equality attitudes 6 .64 
Tolerance toward immigrants 5 .79 
Tolerance toward ethnic groups 5 .84 
Support for conventional citizen participation 6 .71 
Support for social-movement citizen 
participation  
4 .75 
Interest in social and political issues 5 .87 
Internal political efficacy 6 .85 
Trust attitudes 6 .84 
Attitudes towards one’s country  7 .82 
 
Exploratory Factor Analyses 
Research Question 2: What is the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation?  
To answer the question about the factor structure of adolescents’ democratic 
orientation, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. An exploratory factor analysis 
has three main functions: (a) to explore the structure of a set of variables, (b) to develop a 
measure of a latent variable, and (c) to reduce a data set to a more manageable size by 
combining variables into specific factors (Fields, 2005). Previous theoretical research and 
empirical studies of democratic citizen orientation, reviewed in detail in Chapter 2, 
suggest that democratically oriented citizens possess a variety of characteristics, 
including support for basic democratic values, trust in other people and government 
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institutions, willingness to participate in social and political activities. Consensus about 
the accuracy and reliability of different measures of democratic beliefs remains to be 
achieved. In a similar vein, no agreement exists about the relationship among these 
variables. In light of the above, it is justifiable to expect that combining some of the items 
available from the ICCS study might produce measures of the latent dimensions of 
democratic citizen orientation, operationalized in this research as a set of attitudes and 
behavioral intentions conducive to democratic advancement.  
Goodness of Fit 
Several analytical procedures necessary to ensure the goodness of fit were 
conducted prior to testing the latent structure of adolescents’ democratic orientation. 
First, to ensure a stable factor solution it is important to consider the sample size. 
Opinions with regard to an optimal sample size for a reliable factor analysis vary. Thus, 
some have argued that having 10-15 participants per variable is a necessary condition to 
ensure adequate test parameters (for example, Kass & Tinsley, 1979; Nunnally, 1978; 
Fields, 2005). Others have proposed a sample size of at least 300 cases for carrying out 
factor analysis (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, and Hing 
(1999) indicated that determining an adequate sample size for factor analysis depends not 
only on the number of variables but also on the value of communalities. In more detail, 
they established that lower values of communality factor requires larger sample size. 
Furthermore, Guadagnoli and Velicer (cited in Fields, 2005) argued that a factor with 
four or more loadings with values .6 or higher is reliable regardless of a sample size.  
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Finally, another way to ensure sampling adequacy is to use the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure (KMO). The KMO statistics ranges from zero to one and represents “the 
ratio of the squared correlation between variables to the squared partial correlation 
between variables” (Fields, 2005, p. 640). In other words, a KMO value indicates 
whether a factor solution can be considered appropriate given a specific sample size. In 
general, lower KMO values suggest that there might be a problem with either a number 
of cases available for analysis or that the variables selected for factor analysis should be 
reconsidered. More specifically, values higher than .5 are considered barely acceptable, 
values between .5 and .7 are mediocre, values between .7 and .8 are good and values 
above .9 are great.  
Secondly, an important consideration that ensures a reliable factor analysis deals 
with intercorrelation between variables. Generally, variables that do not correlate with 
each other as well as variables that correlate too highly (R < .9) are excluded from factor 
analysis. To ensure that the variables selected for the analysis satisfy necessary 
conditions, a bivariate correlation matrix of all variables was created (see Appendix B for 
correlation coefficients). Thirdly, it is important to ensure that the selected variables 
satisfy the assumption of normality.  
Principal Component Analysis  
Principal component analysis was used to locate underlying dimensions of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation. According to Fields (2005), principal component 
analysis is a “psychometrically sound procedure” and “less complex than factor analysis” 
(p. 631). Direct oblimin rotation, a method of oblique rotation, was used to improve 
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interpretation of factor solutions. Theoretical grounds for choosing oblique rotation stem 
largely from an argument articulated by Inglehart (2006) who claimed that “people who 
support democracy on one indicator, tend to support democracy on the other indicators” 
(p. 2003). Although the present analysis of adolescents’ democratic orientation goes 
beyond support for democracy as a form of government, it is expected that factors of 
adolescents’ democratic mindset will correlate with each other. In addition, some have 
argued that data from experiments involving humans should be analyzed via oblique 
rotations only (for example, Fields, 2005). The main argument for such claims is that 
there are hardly any psychological constructs that are not related to another psychological 
construct.   
Ten variables were included in the model to explore the relationships among them 
and to test the possibility of locating distinct dimensions within adolescents’ democratic 
mindset. For a complete list of items that comprised each of the ten variables, see 
Appendix A. The items included in the analysis correlated with at least one item at the 
level of .30 or above. Correlation coefficients are shown in Table 1 in Appendix B. The 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure was .72 demonstrating acceptable sampling adequacy.  
Table 4 demonstrates a factor solution that emerged after running the analysis. 
Items that express support for democratic values, gender equality attitudes, and tolerance 
toward ethnic and immigrant groups load highly on the same factor, which can be 
characterized as a civil liberties orientation. Political efficacy, political interest, and 
values of conventional and social movement citizenship load on the second factor and 
can be considered as a sense of engagement. Finally, trust related variables and items 
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indicating adolescents’ attitudes toward their country of origin group together. However, 
because two items are not sufficient to define a factor, the third component, although 
distinct, cannot be classified as an independent factor. However, due to its conceptual 
relevance, it was included in subsequent analyses. In this regard, rather than being 
interpreted as two separate items, the two variables were analyzed together by computing 
the mean score. Overall, the identified components explained over 59% of the total 
variance. Of note, this structure solution is consistent for the international pooled sample 
as well as for individual countries.  
Table 4: Factor Loadings for Indices Measuring Adolescents’ Democratic 
Orientation   
Items  Factor 1 
Civil 
liberties 
Factor 2 
Engagement 
Factor 3 
Trust 
Commun
alities 
Support for democratic values  .636   .448 
Gender equality  .717   .496 
Equal rights for ethnic 
minorities  
.780   .657 
Equal rights for immigrants  .747   .565 
Conventional citizenship  .599  .577 
Social movement citizenship  .442  .419 
Interest in politics and social 
issues 
 .843  .704 
Internal political efficacy  .849  .675 
Trust in institutions   .829 .700 
Attitudes towards one’s 
country 
  .831 .682 
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In sum, the factor analysis revealed that adolescents’ democratic orientation 
presents a three-dimensional pattern of attitudinal and behavioral norms. An initial 
examination of items that compose each of the underlying dimensions suggests that the 
following factors can describe adolescents’ democratic mindset: (a) civil liberties, (b) 
engagement, and (c) trust.     
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Results obtained from the previous analysis suggest that there are at least two 
distinct components in adolescents’ democratic orientation, civil liberties and 
engagement. To test how well the identified dimensions fit the data utilized in the current 
study, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted.  
According to Hu and Bentler (1999) and Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen (2008), the 
following indices were used to test the goodness-of-fit proposition: Chi-square (CMIN) 
(χ2 > .05), the Goodness-of-Fit statistic (GFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI > .96), and 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA < .05). The results for both models 
are reported in Table 5.  
As the table demonstrates, the Chi-square statistics for both models were 
significant suggesting the models were a poor fit. However, given a number of limitations 
associated with the use of this measure, the results should be interpreted with caution. 
First, Chi-square statistic has been found to be sensitive to sample size (Bentler & 
Bonnet, 1980). Specifically, when large sample sizes are used, as is the case in this study, 
the Chi-square test tends to be significant thus rejecting the model. Secondly, the Chi-
square test assumes multivariate normality (McIntosh (2006) as cited in Hooper, 
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Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). Thus due to restrictiveness of this measure, an alternative 
index was used to evaluate the model fit. The GFI values of .95 and above is usually 
interpreted as indicating a good model fit (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). As is 
shown, the GFI statistics for both models are 1. Additionally, CFI and RMSEA yielded 
positive results, demonstrating both models are a good fit for the data.   
Table 5: Model Fit Indices for Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Component 
(factor)   
χ2 df p GFI CFI RMSEA 
Civil 
liberties 
15.61 1 .01 1.00 .99 .03 
Engagement  .53 1 .47 1.00 1.00 .00 
 
Reliability Statistics for Democratic Orientation Measures  
Following the confirmatory factor analysis, two scales were created reflecting the 
structure of each of the factors. To ensure that a two-factor classification of adolescents’ 
democratic orientation presents a consistent measure, reliability analyses were conducted 
to test psychometric properties of the derived scales. Specifically, Cronbach’s α 
coefficients were calculated to examine the extent to which the two scales measured a 
specific underlying factor. Results showed that both scales appeared reliable measures of 
civil liberties and engagement dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientations, with 
Cronbach’s α of .70 and .72, respectively.  
For a more systematic analysis of democratic orientation, the variables associated 
with the trust component were grouped together to make a liner additive index. Thus two 
scales and one composite measure were created: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and 
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(c) trust. The scores computed from each of the measures were then used to examine 
variability in democratic attitudes among adolescents across countries as well as to 
explore possible explanations for such variation.   
Stage II: Hypotheses Testing  
Describing Differences in Democratic Orientations 
Hypothesis 1: There are significant differences in democratic orientations among 
adolescents from different countries.    
To answer the question about variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations, 
mean scores for each of the three dimensions of democratic orientation were calculated. 
Overall, the mean scores for the pooled sample were: 49.60 with a standard deviation of 
7.25 for the civil liberties dimension; 48.72 (SD = 7.27) for the engagement dimension; 
and 49.8 (SD = 9.55) for the trust dimension. Figures 3 represents average levels of 
endorsement of the civil liberties dimensions among adolescents in the 20 countries 
analyzed in this research. Figures 4 and 5 present mean scores for the other two aspects 
of adolescents’ democratic orientations.  
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Figure 3: Average Civil Liberties Score by Country    
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Figure 4: Average Engagement Score by Country    
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Figure 5: Average Trust Score by Country    
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ends of the score distribution. For example, Italy has the highest level of engagement and 
Belgium presents the case with the lowest score.  
These results indicate that democratic orientation does not present a common 
pattern in established and aspiring democracies. Analysis of these country data in a more 
systematic way might yield more coherent results. One such way is to explore country 
differences utilizing different country categories, such as aspiring versus established 
democracies. The following section addresses this issue.  
Hypothesis 2: There are significant differences among adolescents from aspiring and 
established democracies in terms of their democratic orientations.  
A T-test analysis was conducted to find out whether adolescents in aspiring 
democracies and established democracies demonstrated differed significantly in: (a) civil 
liberties values, (b) engagement, and (c) trust. Figure 6 presents the obtained results.  
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Figure 6: Average Levels of Democratic Orientations among Adolescents in 
Aspiring and Established Democracies   
 
Note: Mean scores are shown for adolescents in aspiring democracies (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and 
Russia) and established democracies (Austria, Belgium Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, 
The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).  
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of democratic orientation dealing with social and political engagement, adolescents from 
aspiring democracies showed higher levels of engagement (M = 49.07, SD = 2.06) 
compared to adolescents from established democracies (M = 48.42, SD = 2.36). Mean 
levels of endorsement of each of the three democratic orientation factors are presented in 
Figure 6. Of note, because Levine’s test was significant (p < .001), indicating that the 
assumption of equality of variances was violated, a t statistic not assuming homogeneity 
of variance was considered. Thus the results should be interpreted with caution. 
As can be seen from Figure 6, adolescents in established democracies have, on 
average, higher levels of democratic orientation. In contrast, adolescents in aspiring 
democracies tend to score lower on the identified aspects of democratic orientation, with 
the exception of the engagement dimension. How does a history of a country’s past 
regime relate to this variation in democratic orientation? How might a different, more 
detailed, classification of countries affect the distribution of scores? The section that 
follows addresses these questions.  
Examining Variation in Democratic Orientations 
Hypothesis 1: There is a significant positive relationship between a country’s history of 
democratic tradition and adolescents’ democratic orientations.  
To test the hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between adolescents’ 
democratic orientations and past regimes of their countries, bivariate correlational 
analyses were conducted. Specifically, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed 
for each dimension of democratic orientation and a past regime of the adolescents’ 
country of origin. At first glance, results seem to confirm the hypothesized relationships 
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and are consistent with the findings established in the first part. However, a closer look at 
the data revealed that the first hypothesis was supported only partially. There was a 
significant positive relationship between adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and a 
history of democratic tradition in their countries , r(21762) = .57,  p < .001. A significant 
positive relationship was also established between adolescents’ trust and a history of 
democratic tradition, r(21762) = .41,  p < .001. Surprisingly, the relationship between the 
engagement dimension of democratic orientation and a history of democratic tradition 
was found to be negative, r(21762) = -.14,  p < .001.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a significant negative relationship between a country’s history of 
communism and adolescents’ democratic orientation.  
Correlations between dimensions of democratic orientation and a country’s 
history of communism indicate that a significantly negative relationship exists between 
two dimensions of democratic orientation, trust and civil liberties, and a history of 
communism, r(21762) = -.57,  p < .001 and r(21762) = -.41,  p < .001, respectively. 
Additionally, a significant positive correlation was established between a history of 
communism and the engagement aspect of democratic orientation, r(21762) = .14,  p 
< .001.  
The results presented so far indicate that history appears an important element in 
examining cross-cultural variation in adolescents’ democratic orientations. To what 
extent do different historical legacies influence this variation? This question was 
addressed in the following section.  
Hypothesis 3: Historical legacies impact adolescents’ democratic orientations differently.  
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Hypothesis 3a: Adolescents in states with Patrimonial communist legacy will have lower 
levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and 
Accommodative communist legacies.  
Hypothesis 3b: Adolescents in states with Bureaucratic communist legacy will have 
lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with 
Accommodative communist legacy. 
Hypothesis 3c: Adolescents in states with Accommodative communist legacy will have 
lower levels of democratic orientation than adolescents in states with a legacy of 
democratic tradition.  
A one-way ANOVA was used to test the impact of different types of historical 
legacy on democratic orientations. Where the initial differences were established, 
posteriori tests were conducted to elicit specific group differences. Results are 
summarized below for each of three dimensions. Table 6 presents mean scores and 
standard deviations for each dimension by legacy.  
Table 6: Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation by Historical Legacy 
Historical legacy Civil liberties Engagement Trust  
Bureaucratic socialism  
(Czech Republic, Slovak Republic) 
48.33 (.58) 46.35 (.41) 47.05 (.99) 
Accommodative socialism 
(Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Poland) 
49.17 (.98) 49.42 (1.50) 47.22 (1.83) 
Patrimonial socialism 
(Bulgaria, Russia) 
48.26 (1.00) 51.10 (.83) 50.87 (2.10) 
Democratic tradition 
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium) 
50.35 (1.31) 48.42 (2.36) 50.05 (2.10) 
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Historical legacy and civil liberties. A significant difference was found between 
different types of historical legacies regarding civil liberties, F(3, 21491) = 102.11, p 
< .001. Posteriori tests were conducted to establish group differences, using the 
Bonferroni post hoc criterion for significance. These tests produced mixed results. 
Overall, it was found that adolescents from countries with a history of democracy had 
significantly higher levels of endorsement of civil liberties values (M = 50.35, SD = 7.62) 
than adolescents from countries with all three types of socialist legacies (combined M = 
48.58, SD = 6.62). The comparison of civil liberties endorsement among adolescents 
from states with Bureaucratic and Patrimonial socialist legacies was non-significant. All 
other pairwise comparisons yielded significant results. In short, hypothesis 3a was 
supported partially and hypotheses 3b and 3c were confirmed.   
Historical legacy and engagement. A test of the effect of legacy types on 
engagement produced significant results, suggesting that adolescents from states with 
four different types of legacy had significantly different levels of engagement, F(3, 
21463) = 201.36, p < .001. Posteriori tests further revealed that all four groups were 
significantly different from each other. However, the direction of these relationships 
differed from the hypothesized ones. For example, students in countries with the most 
restrictive types of socialist legacy, Patrimonial legacy, reported higher levels of 
engagement than students in states with less restrictive past socialist regimes. Moreover, 
adolescents in states with Patrimonial legacy scored higher on the engagement measure 
than adolescents in states with a history of democratic tradition. Overall, the results 
indicated that students from countries with more restrictive communist legacies had 
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significantly higher engagement scores than adolescents from countries with less 
restrictive communist legacies. Thus, all hypotheses were rejected.    
Historical legacy and trust. Analyses of the differences in adolescents’ 
democratic orientations on the basis of historical legacy further showed that the effect of 
a specific type of the past regime had an impact on the extent to which adolescents 
displayed trust attitudes, F(3, 21284) = 260.86, p < .001. According to posthoc results, 
adolescents from countries with a history of democratic tradition scored, on average, 
higher (M = 51.20, SD = 9.40) than adolescents from countries with Accommodative (M 
= 46.86; SD = 8.92) and Bureaucratic (M = 48.36, SD = 9.41) communist legacies. 
Surprisingly, adolescents from countries with Patrimonial legacy scored, on average, 
higher than adolescents in countries with Accommodative and Bureaucratic previous 
regimes. However, the results showed no significant difference in trust levels between 
adolescents from countries with a history of democratic tradition and states with 
Patrimonial socialist legacy. Similarly, no significant difference was established in trust 
levels among adolescents in states with Bureaucratic and Accommodative legacies. In 
sum, in regard to trust, hypothesis 3c was supported while hypotheses 3a and 3b were 
rejected.   
Distribution of Scores  
To find out how democratic orientations were distributed among adolescents in 
countries with different types of historical legacies, the sample was divided into two parts 
for each of the factors. The first part consisted of students who reported high levels of 
endorsement of civil liberties, engagement, and trust attitudes. Alternatively, the second 
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part included students with lower levels of endorsement of each of the three factors. For 
purposes of this analysis, the cutting point was the average of each scale, with lower 
scores assigned to those adolescents who scored below the average and higher scores to 
all students who scored above the average. Frequency statistics for both subgroups were 
generated. Table 7 presents the distribution of democratic orientation by each dimension. 
As is shown, countries with a history of democratic tradition have, on average, a higher 
proportion of democratically-oriented adolescents than do countries with communist 
legacies. However, this relationship is reversed when the engagement dimension of 
democratic orientation is considered separately.  
Table 7: Distribution of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations across Historical 
Legacies  
Dimension 
of 
democratic 
orientation  
Level of 
endorsement 
Type of historical legacy  
Bureaucratic 
Socialism 
(%) 
Accommo-
dative 
Socialism 
(%) 
Patrimonial 
Socialism 
(%) 
Established 
democracy 
(%) 
Civil 
liberties 
Low 58.1 52.8 58.6 45.7 
High 41.9 47.2 41.4 54.3 
Engagement  Low 60.3 38.7 29.6 46.6 
High 39.7 61.3 70.4 53.4 
Trust Low 59.3 66.4 48.6 42.1 
High 40.7 33.6 51.4 57.9 
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The Impact of Democratic Institutions 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the quality of democratic 
institutions and adolescents’ democratic orientation.  
To test the hypotheses about the direction of the relationship between adolescents’ 
democratic orientation and the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, 
correlational analyses were conducted. Specifically, Pearson correlation coefficients were 
computed for each dimension of democratic orientation and the quality of democracy in 
adolescents’ country of origin. Hypothesis 4 was supported only partially. There was a 
significant positive relationship between adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and 
the quality of democratic institutions in their countries, r(21762) = .59, p < .001. A small 
but significant positive relationship was also established between adolescents’ trust and 
the quality of democracy, r(21762) = .12,  p < .001. Conversely, the engagement 
dimension of democratic orientation appeared to be negatively related to the quality of 
democratic institutions, r(21762) = -.55, p < .001. The below figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate 
these results.  
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Figure 7: The Quality of Democracy and Civil Liberties  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
 
Figure 8: The Quality of Democracy and Trust  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121 
 
Figure 9: The Quality of Democracy and Engagement 
 
  
 
Thus far, the results demonstrate that both historical legacy and the quality of 
contemporary democratic institutions have an effect, to varying degrees, on adolescents’ 
democratic orientation. The question arises as to whether one of the two broad factors is 
more influential in determining adolescents’ endorsement of each of the three democratic 
dimensions. This question is addressed next.     
Hypothesis 5: Historical legacy is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic 
orientation than the current quality of democratic institutions. 
To determine whether historical legacy or the quality of current democratic 
institutions is more important in determining adolescents’ democratic orientation, 
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multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted. MANOVA is often 
considered an extension of simple ANOVA techniques and is used to determine group 
differences in models with more than one dependent variable (Field, 2005). Among 
advantages of this technique is that it allows to take into account several dependent 
variables simultaneously as well as interaction between these variables.    
General linear modeling (GLM) procedure was utilized to test the effects of 
historical legacies and the quality of democratic institutions on each of the three 
dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation. In addition, a third variable denoting 
the gender of adolescents was added to the model. Because of the continuous nature of 
the variable, the Quality of Democracy Index was entered as a covariate. Altogether, two 
different models were run to test the hypothesis. First, individual sores were used in each 
predictor variable. The model was then ran again, using aggregate country scores for the 
dependent variables. Table 8 contains the results of both tests. The F value statistics 
indicate the relative contribution of each predictor variable to value of the outcome 
variable. Higher values indicate better explanatory power.  
The hypothesis was only partially supported. With the exception of trust, the 
results revealed that the quality of democratic institutions has a greater effect on 
adolescents’ democratic orientation than historical legacy (coefficients presented in bold 
in Table 8). Conversely, historical legacy appeared a better contributor to the trust 
dimension of adolescents’ democratic orientation. Overall, the results were consistent for 
both individual scores and aggregate measures.  
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Additionally, the results revealed some differences in regard to explanatory power 
of the determinant variables. Gender was found to be an important determinant of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation. Despite the fact that the effect of gender was not 
specified in the hypothesis, it was found to outweigh both historical legacy and the 
quality of democratic institutions in its influence on civil liberties. Interestingly, the 
gender effect disappeared when aggregate scores were entered in the model. Table 8 
summarizes these results.        
Table 8: The Impact of Historical Legacies and the Quality of Democratic 
Institutions on Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation 
Determinant 
Variable 
 
Dependent Variable F Value 
(individual scores) 
F Value 
(aggregate 
scores) 
Intercept  Civil liberties 
Engagement 
Trust 
6717.62** 
13005.17** 
5139.25** 
291999.13** 
313161.78** 
91480.78** 
Historical Legacy  Civil liberties 
Engagement 
Trust 
21.97** 
203.04** 
251.45** 
1030.47** 
4379.56** 
4914.01** 
Quality of 
Democracy  
Civil liberties 
Engagement 
Trust 
59.46** 
644.81** 
49.13** 
2588.26** 
15530.90** 
860.97** 
Gender Civil liberties 
Engagement 
Trust 
479.36** 
.001  
5.56* 
.46 
.37 
.55  
 
Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001.  
 
Exploring Implications of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the level of democratic orientation among adolescents, the 
higher their intentions with regard to participation in future social and political activities.     
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Hierarchical Regressions 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to find out whether 
students’ democratic orientation influences their intentions in regard to participation in 
future social and political activities. Specifically, the regression analyses tested to what 
extent each dimension of democratic orientation predicts students’ involvement in 
different political and social activities. Altogether, five different regressions were run for 
each form of expected participation: involvement in legal protest, involvement in illegal 
protest, electoral participation, formal political participation, and informal political 
participation. Of note, the primary goal of these analyses was to investigate the 
relationship between different aspects of adolescents’ democratic orientation and their 
expected involvement in social and political activities, rather than create a model that 
predicts factors that best explain such future involvement. That is why a limited number 
of independent variables were used. 
Based on theoretic considerations and previous research, two indicators of 
students’ background, gender and home literacy resources, were entered into the model 
first. To find out how much each of the dimensions of democratic orientation would 
contribute to each form of participation, “civil liberties,” “engagement,” and “trust” 
variables were entered as a second, third, and fourth and steps, respectively. Regression 
analyses were repeated for each of the five available types of participation. R
2 
statistic 
indicates the significance and amount of variance explained by each predictor. R
2 
change 
statistic represents the unique amount of variance that is explained solely by the predictor 
entered in a specific step. Unstandardized coefficients (reported in Table 9 along with 
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standard errors) denote the extent to which each predictor explains variation in 
participatory expectations. The results are presented below for each dimension of 
democratic orientation. Table 9 summarizes the results and presents them in five groups, 
one for each type of expected participation. Unstandardized regression coefficients are 
reported with standard errors in parentheses.   
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Table 9: Regression of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation on their Expected Participation in Future Political and 
Social Activities  
Variables Involvement in Legal Protest Involvement in Illegal Protest Electoral  Participation   
Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 
3 
Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Step 1:  
Home 
literacy 
resources 
 
Gender 
(1=girl) 
 
.91** 
(.05) 
 
1.18** 
(.13) 
 
.67** 
(.05) 
 
.35* 
(.13) 
 
.42**  
(.05) 
 
.80** 
(.12) 
 
.43**  
(.5) 
 
.82** 
(.12) 
 
-.27** 
(.05) 
 
-3.23** 
(.14) 
 
-.15* 
(.05) 
 
-2.8** 
(.14) 
 
-.18* 
(.05) 
 
-2.8** 
 (.14) 
 
-.24** 
(.05) 
 
-2.9** 
(.14) 
 
1.37** 
(.05) 
 
.80** 
(.14) 
 
1.04** 
(.05) 
 
-.31* 
(.13) 
 
.76** 
(.05) 
 
.22 
(.12) 
 
.84** 
(.05) 
 
.35* 
(.12) 
Step 2:  
Civil liberties 
 
  
.29** 
(.01) 
 
.16** 
(.01) 
 
.16** 
(.01) 
  
-.15** 
(.01) 
 
-.16** 
(.01) 
 
-.15** 
(.01) 
 
 
 
.40** 
(.01) 
 
.24** 
(.01) 
 
.22** 
(.01) 
Step 3: 
Engagement 
   
.48** 
(.01) 
 
.47** 
(.01) 
  
 
 
.05** 
(.01) 
 
.11** 
(.010) 
 
 
  
.560** 
(.01) 
 
.49** 
(.01) 
Step 4:  
Trust 
    
.02** 
(.11) 
    
-.18** 
(.01) 
    
.22 
(.01) 
R
2
 .020** .07** .18** .18** .028** .04** .04** .06** .03** .11** .26** .28** 
R
2 
change   .05** .12** .001*  .01** .001** .02**  .07** .15** .03** 
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Table 9 (Continued)  
Variables Formal Political Participation Informal Political Participation 
Steps Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
Step 1:  
Home literacy 
resources 
 
Gender (1=girl) 
 
.32** 
(.05) 
 
-1.01** 
(.13) 
 
.30** 
(.05) 
 
-1.08** 
(.13) 
 
.01 
(.05) 
 
-.54** 
(.12) 
 
.08 
(.05) 
 
-.43** 
(.12) 
 
.74** 
(.05) 
 
.29* 
(.13) 
 
.60** 
(.05) 
 
-.17 
(.13) 
 
.30** 
(.04) 
 
.46** 
(.17) 
 
.27** 
(.04) 
 
.47** 
(.116) 
Step 2:  
Civil liberties 
 
  
.03* 
(.01) 
 
.13** 
(.01) 
 
.14** 
(.01) 
  
.162** 
(.01) 
 
.03* 
(.01) 
 
.03* 
(.01) 
Step 3: 
Engagement 
   
.57** 
(.01) 
 
.50** 
(.01) 
   
.68** 
(.01) 
 
.68** 
(.01) 
Step 4:  
Trust 
    
.20** 
(.01) 
 
    
.02** 
(.01) 
R
2
 .01** .01** .18** .20** .01** .03** .27** .27** 
R
2 
change  .001** .17** .02**  .02** .25** .001** 
 
Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001 
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The Effect of Civil Liberties on Prospective Citizen Participation  
A series of hierarchical regressions examined whether adolescents’ endorsement 
of civil liberties predicts their intentions to participate in political life upon reaching 
adulthood. Because the civil liberties variable was entered as the second step in all 
models, the results for all types of participation can be obtained from the row Step 2 in 
Table 9 below.  
In general, adding the civil liberties variable resulted in modest but significant 
improvements to the models by increasing the proportion of total explained variance of 
various kinds of anticipated participation. Specifically, in the models of anticipated 
involvement in legal and illegal protest, civil liberties variable produced a significant 
change in the total explained variance, F (3, 20892) = 489.91, p < .001 and F (3, 20836) 
= 281.40, p < .001, respectively. In the model of prospective electoral participation, the 
addition of civil liberties was also significant, F (3, 20814) = 84271, p < .001. Finally, 
civil liberties was as significant contributor to in the models projecting future 
participation in formal and informal political activities, F (3, 20796) = 34.17, p < .001 
and F (3, 20759) = 177.35, respectively.  
The percentage of the unique portion of the variance explained by civil liberties 
ranged from 1% in formal and informal forms of participation to 7% in the involvement 
in legal protest. Out of five types of participation examined, civil liberties appeared to 
have the most influence on expected electoral participation than on other type of future 
participation, with R
2
 = .11, p > .001.  
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Interestingly, civil liberties entered one model negatively, suggesting that the 
higher adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties, the lower their intentions with regard 
to participation in illegal protest in the future. These results provide initial evidence about 
the significance of this particular aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their 
future involvement. 
The Effect of Engagement on Prospective Citizen Participation 
Adding the engagement variable to the models of expected citizen participation 
resulted in significant change in the amount of variance associated with the models, 
suggesting that adolescents’ engagement appears a significant predictor of their intentions 
to participate in all five types of future citizen activities. The biggest contribution was 
observed in regard to the following two activities: (a) prospected participation in 
elections and (b) prospected participation in informal political activities. The unique 
portion of variance attributed to these models was 26% and 27%, respectively. Next, 
engagement appeared to increase the likelihood of holding positive views about future 
participation in future formal activities and legal protest, with 18% of variation explained 
for both models. The smallest contribution of this variable was observed in the model of 
expected involvement in illegal protest, where engagement accounted for 4% of total 
variance. In contrast to the previously analyzed aspect of civil liberties, the engagement 
variable did not enter any of the models negatively, suggesting that, all other variables 
being the same, the higher adolescents’ engagement, the higher they rate their likelihood 
of getting involved in political and social activities upon reaching adulthood.   
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The Effect of Trust on Prospective Citizen Participation 
A unique contribution of the trust aspect of adolescents’ democratic orientation 
was assessed in the 4
th
 step of each of the five regressions models. Similar to the other 
two aspects, civil liberties and engagement, trust appeared a significant predictor of all 
forms of future participatory activities. Also, similar to the civil liberties dimension, 
adding trust to the model of expected involvement in illegal protest produced a negative 
coefficient, suggesting that higher levels of trust among adolescents diminish their 
intentions to get involved in illegal protest as adults. Of note, trust was found to be the 
smallest contributor to all models of prospective participation in comparison with the 
other two dimensions. Thus, the percentage of unique variance explained by trust ranged 
from less than 1% to 3%, for models predicting involvement in legal protest and electoral 
participation, respectively.   
Summary for Regressions  
Overall, the regression analyses showed that adolescents’ democratic orientation 
significantly influences their expectations with regard to future participation in various 
political and social activities. These influences appeared significant, regardless of 
adolescents’ gender or home literacy resources. In more detail, it was established that the 
likelihood of adolescents’ future participation in social and political activities is better 
explained by their current levels of engagement than by their endorsement of civil 
liberties values or trust attitudes.  
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Bonus Research 
Bonus Research Hypothesis: Adolescents can be classified into distinct groups based on 
their democratic orientation.  
Why do cross-cultural differences in adolescents’ democratic orientation matter? 
Before addressing this question, it is first necessary to establish whether it is, indeed, 
possible to discriminate adolescents of one country, or group of countries, from 
adolescents in another state based on their responses to a series of questions relevant to 
democracy. To test this claim, a discriminant function analysis was carried out. In more 
detail, two discriminant function analyses utilizing both sources of democratic orientation 
– (a) the scores from the three dimensions of democratic orientation and (b) scores from 
the original ICCS scales of democratic attitudes - were run. This was done in order to 
compare the predictive power of each measure. Of note, only seven original scales were 
used because discriminant analysis allows a limited number of predictor variables (for 
details, see Fields, 2005, or Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996 ). Kitschelt’s  historical legacies 
classification modified by Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon (2010) was used as a dependent 
variable for classifying adolescents into groups.  
Overall, results revealed three significant variates that differentiate between 
different groups that represent historical legacies of adolescents’ countries of origin. In 
other words, differences between adolescents’ democratic orientations can be explained 
with the help of three underlying dimensions. Thus, the results established that 
adolescents’ attitudes toward gender equality, trust attitudes, and feelings of internal 
political efficacy make the largest contribution to each of the three identified variates. Of 
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note, the variable measuring support for gender equality makes the largest contribution in 
comparison with other variables in the model. Appendix C presents details on each of the 
variates. The distinction between different groups is seen in Figure 10 that presents a 
combined plot of group scores for each country. The variate scores are presented for 
adolescents, grouped according to the historical legacy of their country. Group centroids 
(shown in red in Figure 10) indicate average variate scores for each country grouping.  
Additionally, the results revealed that original scales of democratic beliefs and 
attitudes were better at categorizing adolescents into groups with corresponding historical 
legacies than the three dimensions of democratic orientation. Thus, the discriminant 
analysis conducted with the original variables related to the endorsement of democratic 
principles correctly classified 95.5% of the original grouped cases. In turn, the three 
dimensions of democratic orientation were able to classify 73.1% of adolescents as 
belonging to a group with a specific historical legacy. The results presented above and 
shown in Figure 10 relate to the analysis that utilized scores from the original ICCS 
scales of democratic attitudes.  
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Figure 10: Country Groupings based on Adolescents’ Democratic Orientations 
 
Note: Types of Historical Legacy:      Bureaucratic socialism;        Patrimonial socialism;  
               Accommodative socialism;      Established democracy.   
Bonus Finding 
Throughout this research, support for gender equality has consistently appeared 
among the most powerful variables responsible for cross-cultural variation in 
adolescents’ democratic orientations. In investigating the relationship between 
institutional characteristic and adolescents’ democratic orientation, a surprisingly strong 
relationship was established (R
2
 linear = .77). The relevant scores were plotted in order to 
show the degree of interrelationship between the two variables. Figure 11 illustrates the 
results.  
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Figure 11: Adolescents’ Gender Equality Attitudes and the Quality of Democracy  
 
 
Note: Types of Historical Legacy:      Bureaucratic socialism;        Patrimonial socialism;  
               Accommodative socialism;      Established democracy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
Summary and Analysis of Findings 
Data analyses addressed the three main objectives of this research. First, an 
exploratory factor analysis identified the underlying dimensions of adolescents’ 
democratic orientation, followed by confirmatory and reliability analyses that verified a 
latent structure of democratic orientation and established construct validity of scales that 
measure the identified dimensions. Second, the results revealed important cross-cultural 
variations in the degree to which adolescents display each of the dimensions of 
democratic orientation. Specifically, the levels of endorsement of civil liberties values, 
engagement, and trust attitudes varied among adolescents’ in established and aspiring 
democracies. Additionally, correlational analyses established important relationships 
between country-level variations in adolescents’ democratic orientations and historical 
legacies of their countries on the one hand and the quality of contemporary democratic 
institutions on the other hand. Third, this study established that adolescents’ democratic 
orientation matters for a long-term democratic outlook of their countries. Controlling for 
some factors, adolescents’ democratic orientation appeared significant predictors of their 
intentions to participate in political and social matters upon reaching adulthood. 
These results are important for several reasons. First, this study sheds light on the 
nature of democratic attitudes and values displayed by adolescents in countries with 
varying social, economic, and political situations. In doing so, the study confirms the 
validity of cultural theories in explaining variation in democratic attitudes among 
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younger generations. Additionally, the results indicate that institutional approaches to 
studying democratic preferences provide important insights for analyzing these attitudes 
among 14-15 year olds. Finally, with respect to potential consequences of adolescents’ 
democratic attitudes, this research contributes to the literature on democratization by 
projecting the extent to which the analyzed societies might have politically and socially 
active citizens in years to come. The sections below analyze these results in more detail 
and consider implications from the study for research and policy making.  
Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation: One Concept, Three Dimensions 
Similar to other concepts commonly used in social science research, the concept 
of a democratic citizen orientation is latent in nature and cannot be measured directly. 
This is reflected in a lack of consensus on the part of researchers and policymakers on 
how to best describe and analyze individuals’ values and attitudes associated with a 
democratic way of life. As a result, no single measure has been created to capture public 
endorsement of democratic values. Instead, researchers have employed various 
instruments and analytic techniques in attempts to assess different aspects of individuals’ 
democratic mindset. One such technique, factor analysis, was utilized in this study. By 
employing factor analysis techniques, one can identify underlying dimensions, or latent 
components, that reflect the multi-faceted concept of a democratic orientation.  
Considering findings from classical and modern studies of democracy, a number 
of elements within democratic orientation were identified as necessary features of a 
democratically-oriented citizen: tolerance and respect for diversity, gender equality, 
interest in social and political affairs of the country and willingness to participate in them, 
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and trust. Variables reflecting adolescents’ democratic orientation were entered into a 
model and subjected to an exploratory factor analysis. The factors that emerged from this 
analysis could be meaningfully interpreted as supporting the initial proposition about the 
multidimensional character of a democratic citizen orientation. Specifically, adolescents’ 
democratic orientation was found to revolve around three broad themes: (1) equity, 
tolerance, and respect for diversity; (2) active role of citizens in a society, and (3) 
perceived legitimacy of democratic institutions and state authorities. Of note, the analyses 
conducted with individual countries versus the pooled sample produced the same results, 
suggesting that adolescents across countries do not possess a homogenous democratic 
mindset, but rather that their democratic orientation presents a multidimensional pattern 
of three distinct but interrelated dimensions consistently present across countries. Results 
from confirmatory factor analyses further supported this initial finding by indicating that 
the models were a good fit for the data utilized in this study.       
The results of exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses are representative of 
two major theoretical perspectives on democratic society. Specifically, the identified 
dimensions reflect the participatory, or communitarian, view of democracy as well as the 
perspective of liberal democratic theorists. The first perspective is evident in the 
engagement disposition domain, while the second is reflected in the civil liberties 
dimension of adolescents’ democratic worldview. Trust appears to be an important 
component in democratic societies from the point of view of theorists of both liberal and 
participatory democracy. More generally, this conceptualization of democratic orientation 
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is consistent with previous theoretic inquiries that established multidimensional nature of 
democracy (for example, Dahl, 1971).   
In sum, defining a democratically-oriented citizen has been a subject of ongoing 
debates in academic, policy, and government circles. Despite differences in the way 
researchers, scholars, and even ordinary individuals perceive democratic citizenry, there 
is a general agreement that this notion is highly complex. This research adds to the 
literature by suggesting a three-dimensional way of examining attitudes, values, and 
behaviors of one of the younger cohorts of democratically-oriented citizens, 14-15 year-
olds. Thus based on the findings, adolescents’ democratic orientation can be 
characterized as a complex concept that integrates three separate but interrelated 
components: (a) civil liberties, (b) engagement, and (c) trust attitudes.  
Variation in Democratic Orientations among Adolescents in Aspiring and 
Established Democracies 
Well-established differences in democratic functioning between countries of 
Western Europe and North America on the one hand and post-communist societies of 
Eastern and Central Europe on the other raise the question whether these differences find 
reflection at the level of individuals’ adherence to democratic values and beliefs. 
Comparisons of democratic orientations between adolescents in aspiring and established 
democracies produced mixed answers to this question.  
Overall, important cross-country variations were established in democratic 
orientations among adolescents from different states. Generally, levels of democratic 
orientation were higher among adolescents from established democracies than among 
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adolescents from aspiring democracies. However, a closer look at the data revealed that 
the results were not uniform across the three dimensions of democratic orientation. Thus, 
on measures of civil liberties and trust, students from more established democracies, 
indeed, scored higher than students from states with a less stable or consistent democratic 
record. Conversely, in the area dealing with political and social engagement, adolescents 
in aspiring democracies were found to have higher scores than adolescents in most 
mature democracies. Additional analyses revealed that countries with a history of 
democratic tradition have, on average, a higher proportion of students who score higher 
than average on the measures of democratic orientation than do adolescents in countries 
with a history of communist regime. Interestingly, the direction of this relationship was 
reversed if the engagement dimension of democratic orientation was considered 
separately.  
These findings suggest that adolescents in countries that are moving toward 
democratic consolidation are less trusting and less likely to endorse civil liberties and 
values than their peers in established democracies. This is consistent with research on 
democratization that posits that younger democracies have a long way to go with regard 
to their citizens developing true democratic norms and behaviors (Dimitrova-Grajzl & 
Simon, 2010; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Nikolayenko, 2011b; Rose, 2009).  
Another possible explanation of lower levels of democratic orientation among 
adolescents in aspiring democracies might be reflective of a relatively recent history of 
democratic tradition in these societies. Generally, in consolidated democracies, the adult 
population undertakes the function of passing basic democratic values and behavioral 
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patterns to younger generations. In contrast, adult populations in post-communist 
societies were themselves faced with the need to learn democratic values and to be 
educated about basic principles of a democratic culture (Nikolayenko, 2011). Thus, this 
might be among the reasons why adolescents in aspiring democracies might display 
lower levels of certain aspects of democratic orientation than their peers in established 
democracies. This in turn, points to the need to investigate the processes through which 
adolescent’s acquire democratic values and endorse democratic principles. 
However, the fact that adolescents in post-communist countries are more likely to 
report greater involvement and interest in political and social matters of their countries 
than adolescents in societies with established democratic infrastructure challenges 
conventional wisdom about the weakness of civil society in most post-communist states 
(Howard, 2003). Additionally, these relatively high levels of engagement may be 
considered a positive indicator of prospective democratic developments in aspiring 
democracies (e.g., see Dalton, 2000.  
At the same time, the results indicating low levels of self-reported engagement 
among adolescents in established democracies supports numerous clams in the literature 
of low civic engagement among adolescents and young adults (for example, Flanagan, 
Levine, & Settersten, 2009; Kirby & Kawashima-Ginsburg, 2009; McDonald, 2008; 
Smith et al., 2011; Twenge, Campbell, & Freeman, 2012). In contrast, the observed 
picture of low participation and interest in political and social issues among younger 
generations might be indicative of the changing political culture in established 
democracies, a trend that has occupied political and social science scholars over the last 
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several decades (for a summary see Dalton, 2000). In more detail, proponents of the 
changing democratic landscape, especially with regard to established democracies, argue 
that the general public may no longer endorse some traditional elements of a democratic 
political culture, but rather choose to support new structures and elements within 
democratic society. If this is the case, then it is possible to suggest that a relatively low 
level of adolescents’ engagement is, indeed, indication that they reject this aspect of 
democratic citizen orientation. This, in turn, calls for an expansion of the concept of 
political citizen engagement and, subsequently, for a more thorough investigation of 
alternative ways of measuring citizen engagement.    
Overall, these preliminary differences call for a more thorough investigation of 
factors associated with variation in levels of adolescents’ democratic orientations across 
countries. Potential influences of historical and institutional factors on adolescents’ 
democratic attitudes are discussed next.  
Historical and Institutional Factors in Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation 
Democratization studies reviewed earlier suggest that at least two broad 
theoretical approaches are utilized in research on values, beliefs, and behavioral 
orientations that are relevant for the development of democracy. On the one hand, 
cultural theories emphasize the importance of historical legacies in analyzing and even 
predicting a number of democratic phenomena. On the other hand, institutional 
approaches point to the defining role of contemporary democratic institutions and their 
perceived performance in shaping attitudes and beliefs of democratically oriented 
citizens. This study utilized both approaches by analyzing how each of the two groups of 
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factors associated with variation in democratic attitudes – (1) historical legacy and (2) the 
quality of contemporary democratic institutions – relate to variation in democratic 
orientation among adolescents.  
The Influence of Historical Legacies  
To test whether historic legacies matter for adolescents’ democratic orientatios, 
all cases were divided into four groups according to Dimitrova-Grajzl and Simon’s 
(2010) classification of communist legacies. More specifically, this part of research 
examined the extent to which adolescents’ attitudes and behaviors relevant to democracy 
are associated with a specific type of a previous communist regime. The main hypothesis 
was that the degree to which younger generations in each society endorse democratic 
values would be related to the degree of overall restrictiveness of a specific type of 
historical legacy.    
Overall, it was found that different types of historical legacies were associated 
with the degree to which adolescents (a) endorsed civil liberties values, (b) reported 
interest and involvement in socio-political issues, and (c) placed trust in state institutions 
and authorities. For the most part, the direction of this relationship supported a general 
hypothesis about the persisting influence of historical legacies, indicating that democratic 
orientation among citizens in post-communist societies, including younger generations 
without a direct experience of a communist regime, is still largely influenced by previous 
regimes of their societies. Of note, despite the fact that the hypotheses about the 
restrictiveness of different kinds of post-communist regimes were supported only 
partially, the results merit some attention. Thus, the fact that no negative relationship was 
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documented between adolescents’ engagement and different types of ex-communist 
regimes might indicate that the legacy of communism has more positive implications for 
democracy than what had been accepted before (Dalton, 2000). To some extent, this is 
consistent with earlier claims in the literature about influences of former communist 
regimes on contemporary democratic functioning. As Dalton observed, “The patterns of 
civil society and volunteerism that reinforce citizen action movements in the West are 
seen as reflections of the mobilized society of the Communist era” (p. 934).       
In summary, the answer to the question of how adolescents in states with more 
restrictive former communist regimes compare to adolescents in states with less 
restrictive communist legacies remains unanswered, given mixed results for all three 
dimensions of their democratic orientation.  
The Impact of Democratic Functioning     
An alternative explanation to the question of cross-cultural variation in 
adolescents’ democratic attitudes considers the extent to which societies have developed 
an effective democratic infrastructure (Schimmelfennig, 2000). In considering 
institutional factors associated with adolescents’ democratic orientation, it was 
established that the quality of current democratic institutions was positively related to 
adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and levels of trust. At the same time, a 
negative relationship was observed between the state of democratic institutions and 
engagement potential of adolescents, supporting numerous claims in the literature about 
disengaged younger generations in developed democracies.  
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Another possible explanation might be that adolescents living in transitioning 
democracies are witnessing many rapid transformations that are still occurring in their 
societies and might be directly affected by them. It is possible to suggest that adolescents 
might experience these influences in their day-to-day activities and thus show a genuine 
interest and desire to take a part in these processes. In addition, given the lasting effect 
that historical legacy has on various public attitudes, it is possible to speculate that an 
adolescent might view their society’s past in a positive light by believing that a change is 
possible. That is, in comparison with undemocratic practices of the communist regime, 
adolescents might perceive the current functioning of democratic institutions as a 
successful outcome of citizens’ efforts to change the previous regime. At the same time, 
considering the relative stability of democratic regimes in most Western European and 
Scandinavian states analyzed in this research, adolescents might take certain participatory 
infrastructure for granted and consider participation in conventional political and social 
matters, at least in their conventional forms, less engaging.   
Historical Legacies or Democratic Functioning: What Matters More? 
When a multivariate model of democratic orientation was considered, some 
mixed results were produced with regard to relative contribution of institutional and 
historical factors to adolescents’ democratic orientation. On the one hand, historical 
legacy appeared more important in determining adolescents’ trust attitudes than was the 
quality of current democratic institutions. On the other hand, the contribution of the 
quality of democratic institutions to adolescents’ endorsement of civil liberties and 
engagement potential was significantly higher than that of historical legacies. In other 
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words, an adolescents’ being from a state with a fully developed democratic 
infrastructure is a more powerful indicator of their civil liberties and engagement 
potential than is the legacy of their country of origin.  
In sum, the multivariate model highlighted the influence of historical legacies and 
institutional performance on shaping adolescents’ democratic orientation. The results of 
the multivariate analysis of variance suggest that adolescents display varying levels of 
engagement and civil liberties depending on institutional design and functioning of 
democratic institutions, whereas variation in trust levels is mainly accounted for by 
historical-political context of the countries in which they live. A general conclusion is 
that neither institutional nor cultural theories can provide uniform explanations of 
democratic orientation, at least as displayed by adolescents. That is, one theoretical 
approach might be better at explaining a specific aspect of democratic citizen orientation 
while an alternative theory might be better suited to explain another aspect. This, in turn, 
highlights the need for theoretically innovative ways of analyzing and explaining 
democratic attitudes. That a new explanation is needed is consistent with the current state 
of democratization research in a broad sense, including studies of popular support for 
democracy. As Diamond (2001) noted, “We are still a very long ways from being able to 
determine very clearly and satisfactorily what generates sustainable support for 
democracy” (p. 23).  
Implications of Adolescents’ Democratic Orientation  
The third stage of this research explored implications of adolescents’ democratic 
orientation for their potential involvement in future social and political activities. In more 
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detail, the three dimensions of adolescents’ democratic orientation, civil liberties, 
engagement, and trust, were regressed on five different forms of participation, including 
formal and informal political participation, participation in legal and illegal protests, and 
electoral participation. The results showed that the most important factor explaining 
variation in adolescents’ intentions to participate in future activities was related to their 
current levels of engagement. Thus, adolescents’ scores on the engagement scale 
explained over a quarter of their variation in their intent to vote in future elections or 
participate in informal social and political activities. Civil liberties endorsement appeared 
a modest but significant predictor of students’ intentions to take part in social and 
political life of their societies, accounting for about 7% of variation in one such intention. 
Interestingly, the civil liberties variable entered one regression model negatively, 
suggesting that the higher students’ score on this dimension the less likely they will be to 
participate in illegal activities in the future. Similar effect was observed in terms of trust, 
which produced negative coefficients, suggesting that the more trust adolescents place in 
their state institutions and authorities, the smaller their intentions with regard to 
participation in illegal protest are. However, the results from regressions should be 
interpreted with caution because, as stated earlier, the models were developed primarily 
to test the influence of democratic orientation on students’ predicted participation rather 
than explain factors that account for such intentions.   
Overall, these results confirm one of the main hypotheses of this research about 
the importance of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their future roles as citizens and 
for the future of their countries in general. This has important implications for studies 
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focusing on democratic attitudes among younger generations. As noted in Chapter 2, 
underage populations, including adolescents, are relatively understudied in 
democratization research. In part, a smaller body of research on democratic attitudes 
among younger populations can be explained by a lack of consensus about the validity of 
studying this population group. Specifically, a number of authors have questioned the 
utility of studying political attitudes among younger generations (Newton, 2001). Some 
frequently brought up arguments in this regard include claims that young people’s 
experiences with political institutions are often limited and thus youths cannot form 
objective opinions with regard to certain social or political phenomena. Moreover, it is 
generally accepted that adolescence is a period of intense development during which a 
variety of attitudes, including a pro-democratic orientation, are formed and transformed 
(Denver & Hands, 1990; Sapiro, 2004). Therefore, it is often assumed that attitudes that 
characterize the period of adolescence are rarely stable and have little predictive value for 
future attitudes that adolescents might develop in their adult life.  
With regard to the importance of young people’s attitudes for shaping their future 
values and behaviors, Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) noted:  
People acquire in early life standing predispositions which influence their adult 
perceptions and attitudes. In adulthood, then, they respond in a highly affective 
way to symbols which resemble the attitude objects to which similar emotional 
responses were conditioned or associated in earlier life. Whether or not the issue 
has some tangible consequence for the adult voter’s personal life is irrelevant. 
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One’s relevant personal ‘stake’ in the issue is an emotional, symbolic one; it 
triggers long-held, habitual responses (pp. 370-371). 
At the same time, as emphasized earlier, the value of young people’s perspectives 
on democratic issues stems not only from potential contributions to the future of 
democracy, but also, and even to a greater extent, because forming such a perspective is a 
value in itself.  
Bonus Research 
The bonus part of this research addressed the question of predictive validity of 
measures of democratic orientation for classifying adolescents into distinct groups based 
on their scores on these measures. Historical legacy was used as a grouping variable to 
help establish predictive validity of the measures at focus. In other words, the main goal 
of this analysis was to find out whether democratic orientation could be used to 
distinguish adolescents in countries with a history of communism from adolescents in 
countries with a history of democratic tradition.  
Overall, it could be concluded that adolescents can, in fact, be discriminated by 
different aspects of democratic orientation. Specifically, the discriminant function results 
indicate that among major variables that discriminate between adolescents’ countries of 
origin in terms of their democratic orientation are the following: (a) attitudes toward 
gender equality, (b) trust in institutions, and (c) internal political efficacy. Interestingly, 
each of these three contributors are consistent with the three dimensions of adolescents’ 
democratic orientation identified earlier in this research – civil liberties, trust, and 
engagement.  
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Additionally, it can be suggested that adolescents from states with similar 
historical legacies would display similar democratic orientations. Thus, looking at the 
plot of group scores (see Figure 10 above), it can be that adolescents in Russia and 
Bulgaria, the two states that share the same historical legacy (according to Kitschelt 
(1995, 1997), have more in common with each other in terms of their democratic 
orientations than with adolescents in states with a different communist legacy or with 
history of democratic tradition.      
The results of the discriminant function analysis are important because no 
research has tested the predictive validity of democratic attitudes for classifying 
individuals into different groups. Furthermore, the results have important implications for 
comparative research and policy. Specifically, the results might be used to support 
numerous claims about similarities of post-communist countries on a number of 
important social, economic, and political indicators. Despite obvious differences in 
historical and present conditions across countries in Eastern and Central Europe, 
adolescents in these societies display similar democratic orientations     
Implications for Research and Policy 
Implications of this study are two-fold. First, the results of this dissertation are 
likely to contribute to future research on democratic attitudes and democratization. 
Second, this study has important implications for policies and programs aimed at 
fostering democratic culture.  
The primary goal of this dissertation was to improve the current understanding of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation, which adds to theoretical accounts of democracy. A 
 150 
 
theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that it expands the conceptualization of a 
pro-democratic citizen orientation to include youths from societies with varying degrees 
of democratic advancement. Through quantitative analyses of the ICCS and the Quality 
of Democracy data, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature on attitudes toward 
democratic values among younger generations by suggesting a three-dimensional model 
to explain adolescents’ democratic mindset. Additionally, the research extends 
democratization theory to account for historical legacies and the quality of contemporary 
democratic institutions as forces that influence adolescents’ democratic orientation. In 
doing so, the research confirmed the lasting effects of historical legacies by showing that 
democratic orientation among adolescents with no direct experience of communist 
regime appears constrained by their societies’ past. These findings point to the need for 
more a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the communist past, particularly in 
relation to individuals’ beliefs and values that continue to shape their attitudes towards 
each other and towards the state in general. Another theoretical contribution of this study 
is that it analyzes the potential of emerging democracies to develop successfully based on 
the degree to which youths internalize democratic values and adhere to democratic 
principles.  
In sum, this study extends the previous research on democratic orientation among 
the general public by focusing solely on democratic attitudes among adolescents, a group 
that is relatively understudied in democratization research. Specifically, the dissertation 
adds to the literature through (a) comparing of pro-democratic attitudes and behavioral 
intentions among adolescents from emerging and established democracies, (b) 
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investigating the extent to which historical legacies affect adolescents’ democratic 
orientation, (c) examining links between the quality of democratic institutions and 
adolescents’ democratic orientation, and (d) exploring the relationship between 
adolescents’ democratic orientation and their expectations with regard to future political 
and social participation.  
Consequently, a better understanding of adolescents’ democratic orientation 
should help inform policies designed to promote a culture of democracy and respect for 
democratic values, particularly in transitioning countries. Generally, a policy is most 
effective when it relies on valid and reliable data that provide accurate estimates with 
regard to the population of interest. However, in order to develop and implement 
effective policies that aim to foster a pro-democratic orientation among youths, it is 
necessary first to identify attitudes that can be targeted.  
In light of the above, established cross-cultural variation in democratic attitudes 
elicits several policy implications. As was shown, adolescents in different countries 
display varying levels of trust, endorsement of civil values, and engagement potential. 
That historical legacy is a major force in determining adolescents’ trust levels is 
particularly interesting. Improving adolescents’ perceptions of legitimacy of state 
institutions and authorities have important consequences not only for the current state of 
democracy, but also for prospective societal order. As was demonstrated, adolescents 
who express higher levels of trust are less likely to believe that they will be engaged in 
illegal protest when they reach adulthood. These implications seem particularly relevant 
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for aspiring democracies, where (with an exception of Russia and Bulgaria) there are 
more distrusting adolescents than those who trust. 
At the same time, relatively high levels of engagement among adolescents in most 
aspiring democracies point to a potential for favorable democratic prospects in these 
societies. As Dalton (2000) pointed out the importance of engaged citizens, “Democracy 
expects an active citizenry because it is through discussion, popular interest, and 
involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out in a 
democracy” (p. 927). High levels of citizen involvement, an important attribute of 
effective democracies, might be considered an indicator of long-awaited democratic 
consolidation in states that are at various stages of democratic transformation. Such 
prognoses, however, are beyond the scope of this study and are only suggested as an 
avenue for future research.    
Furthermore, high levels of involvement in social and political matters among 
adolescents in aspiring democracies offer some additional implications for policymaking. 
First of all, what many feared as obstacles in engaging post-communist citizens given 
decades of “ritualized engagement or actual prohibitions on participation” (Dalton, 2002, 
p. 930) appear to have little effect on modern populations, at least among younger 
cohorts. However, the challenge that remains is to channel this high level of engagement 
into meaningful participation. In this regard, more attention needs to be dedicated to 
identify factors that might be responsible for adolescents’ favorable opinions with regard 
to participation and interest in political and social issues. In additon, policies that build on 
and stimulate young people’s engagement should be given priority. Importantly, such 
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policies need to be reflected in concrete programs and initiatives that enable young 
people to develop their participatory skills and exercise their right to have a say in 
matters relevant to their everyday activities. Failure to do so might reverse these positive 
trends in democratic development. As Bandura (1982) observed, “Should change be 
difficult to achieve, given suitable alternatives people will desert environments that are 
unresponsive to their efforts and pursue their activities elsewhere” (p. 141). To some 
extent, increasing number of young people in many post-communist societies who choose 
to live permanently in other, often more developed, states further illustrate the necessity 
to adequately respond to young people’s needs to take part in processes affecting their 
lives.   
In addition, knowledge of democratic orientation among younger populations 
might help formulate tools for a more comprehensive analysis of current and future 
democratic developments. In this regard, this study suggests that the position of youth, 
especially their values and behavioral intentions, needs explicit consideration in measures 
of democratic functioning. Young people’s attitudes and beliefs condition their behavior 
and could determine the course of democratic developments in the near future, as 
demonstrated by findings from regression analyses.  
Finally, the results from this research might inform some policy debates that focus 
on democracy promotion and consolidation. Mainly because the results are not uniform 
but rather mixed, they can be used to support numerous claims that democracy has a long 
way to go in most aspiring democracies. At the same time, those who believe in a more 
promising course of democratic development in transitioning states might find interesting 
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the results suggesting high levels of engagement among adolescents in those states, 
which might indicate that at the level of public beliefs and expectations, democracy has, 
indeed, taken root even in states with the most restrictive former communist regimes. At 
the same time, it should be remembered that democratization is a complex multi-faceted 
process with public attitudes covering just one its aspect (Dalton & Shin, 2003).  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The measures utilized in this study to help explore the structure of adolescents’ 
democratic orientation and describe the context that might shape these attitudes present 
several limitations. Because the data at two levels were used, student and country, the 
limitations are grouped into two broad categories. The first addresses limitations that 
arose when analyzing and interpreting student-level data, while the second deals with 
country-levels indicators. In addition, a few general limitations pertaining to both levels 
are discussed.  
In all analyses, this study utilized cross-sectional data collected from surveys or 
created with the help of observations and analyses of various case studies. Although the 
cross-sectional data used in this research possess obvious advantages (for example, the 
ICCS is the largest comprehensive initiative that collects attitudinal data specifically from 
adolescents), there are some limitations associated with the use of such data. One of the 
most commonly cited limitations is that cross-sectional data provide a snapshot of a 
specific phenomenon or group of phenomena at one specific point in time, thus, making it 
difficult to establish any causal relationships (Dixon, 2006).  
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In addition, the large sample size of this study might have introduced some bias 
with regard to interpretation of statistically significant results. Some of these limitation, 
including significance test coefficients for confirmatory factor analyses, were discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, the sample size should be taken into account when citing the 
conclusions drawn from this study.  
Some caution that should be exercised when interpreting the results of this study 
has to do with the fact that student data are about perceptions rather than observations. 
Although self-reported measures have obvious advantages, they nevertheless present 
limited opportunities for assessing a number of phenomena objectively (Mascherini, 
Vidoni, & Manca, 2011). For example, adolescents might answer questions about 
democratic principles in a certain way because they have an understanding of what the 
right, or socially accepted, answer should be. In other words, adolescents might give the 
answers that they perceive as socially desirable at cost of giving their personal opinions.  
Furthermore, trust and self-efficacy variables included in the analysis of 
democratic orientation present subjective evaluations of the functioning democracy rather 
than normative attitudes toward a general concept of democratic society, such as support 
for freedom of expression or citizen participation in political life. For example, 
adolescents might view trust in governmental institutions as good for democracy, but 
their actual confidence in the government or governmental authorities might not be very 
high. Thus, it is possible that this disconnect between adolescents’ perceptions of norms 
and their actual evaluations of specific democratic conditions in their societies might 
have interfered with the analyses.   
 156 
 
In regard to implications of adolescents’ democratic orientation for their 
prospective involvement in political and social activities, another limitation should be 
mentioned. Despite the fact that political socialization research has established relative 
stability of adolescents’ values and documented their persistence into adult years, the 
measured intentions to participate cannot take into account the possibility of future events 
or changes in beliefs that might occur between the time of the survey and when 
adolescents reach adulthood. Furthermore, the ICCS survey asked adolescents about their 
intentions to participate in specific types of political and social activities. Despite some 
diversity, the scales that were constructed from these items cannot be considered 
comprehensive measures of civic engagement mainly because they capture traditional 
forms of participation while ignoring the possibility of other, unconventional, forms of 
citizen involvement. In addition, measures of students’ prospective involvement in 
various political and social activities should be interpreted with caution because 
conclusions that were made with regard to future citizen involvement did not take into 
account the effect of many covariates at the student, family, and societal levels.  
Next, country-level data used in the study possess additional limitations. First, the 
measures of democratic functioning and historical legacies were limited to existing 
indicators suggested by previous research. Common criticisms associated with the use of 
these measures were discussed earlier, specifically in Chapter 2, in the sections on 
Measuring Democratic Citizen Orientation and Historical Legacies.        
Additionally, a large part of this study focused on country-level rather than 
individual variations in adolescents’ democratic attitudes. Thus potential influence of the 
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so called intermediate-level factors, such as community and family effects, were not 
accounted for. Additionally, interaction effects between factors of the same levels were 
not adequately explored, which might have provided additional insights into the nature of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation. However, it should be noted that the ICCS datasets 
contain information on a number of contextual characteristics, including school- and 
teacher-level data, which might complement the findings obtained from this study.  
Overall, these limitations emphasize the complexity of democratic citizen 
orientation and point to various influences that should be considered when studying these 
complex attitudinal phenomena. In light of these limitations, opportunities for future 
studies of democratization and democratic orientation are presented.  
As was noted earlier, future investigations of democratic citizen orientation would 
benefit from theoretically innovative ways of identifying politically and culturally 
relevant aspects of democratic orientation specifically among adolescents. Such 
innovative approaches should incorporate insights from traditional theories of democratic 
political culture as well as elements from developmental research, sociology and other 
disciplines. Moreover, taking into account limitations resulting from the cross-sectional 
nature of this research, longitudinal studies could offer new avenues for addressing 
existing gaps in the current understanding of democratic citizen orientation and, thus, 
should be given priority. Additionally, some might consider the following questions to 
guide their research: 
- What factors are related to students’ high scores on each of the three 
democratic orientation dimensions?  
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- What individual-level characteristics accompany positive democratic 
orientation? What features might hinder the development of such 
attitudes? What aspects of students’ background relate to differences in 
democratic orientation?  
- What country-level characteristics account for variance in the distribution 
of democratic orientation? 
- What are the processes through which adolescents develop commitment to 
democratic values?  
- What conditions need to be fostered for youths to develop such 
commitments?  
- What changes in citizens’ democratic orientations can feasibly be 
expected to take place in post-communist societies in the coming years, 
given the current state of democratic orientation among adolescents? 
Conclusion 
Democratically oriented citizens are important for a healthy development of 
modern democracies. In determining the course of democratic developments, younger 
generations are traditionally assigned important roles. As this research demonstrated, 
democratic citizen orientation is not just an abstract value or ideal commonly cited in 
democratization literature, but rather it presents a concrete set of individuals’ attitudes 
and behavioral intentions that can be identified and fostered at a relatively early age. A 
preliminary investigation of sources and consequences of adolescents’ democratic 
orientation offers several conclusions.   
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First, although by no means comprehensive, a three-dimensional structure of 
democratic orientation provides evidence that adolescents develop a democratic mindset 
based on a variety of factors, of which historical legacy and the quality of democratic 
institutions appear to have some weight. Secondly, mapping out components of this 
mindset helps establish important cross-cultural differences in the patterns of adolescents’ 
democratic orientations. Furthermore, this dissertation verified the utility of two major 
theoretical approaches to studying values and behaviors relevant for democracy – cultural 
and institutional. Surprisingly, the legacy of communist regimes appears to have a 
positive influence on adolescents’ engagement potential. Finally, the results of the study 
suggest that adolescents’ endorsement of democratic values and principles matter for a 
country’s long-term democratic outlook.  
In sum, this study described the democratic worldview of adolescents from states 
with different stages of democratic development by suggesting a three-dimensional 
classification of democratic orientation. In doing so, it established that adolescents 
display an array of attitudes and behavioral intentions that are reflective of deeper 
cultural norms and values as well as of the functioning of current democratic institutions. 
These attitudes hold relevance for the study of democracy and practical interventions that 
aim to promote a culture of democracy and respect for democratic values. To advance the 
current understanding of democratic attitudes among this age group, future research 
should identify factors that might be responsible for variation in different aspects of 
adolescents’ democratic orientation. From a policy perspective, researchers and policy 
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makers should continue to explore strategies for fostering democratic orientation among 
adolescents. After all, the seeds of all future democracies exist in today’s adolescents.   
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Appendix A: Research Instruments  
Support for Democratic Values 
There are different views about what a society should be like. We are interested in 
your views on this. How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?  
1. Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely.  
2. All people should have their social and political rights respected. 
3. People should always be free to criticize the government publicly.  
4. All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely. 
5. People should be able to protest if they belief a law is unfair.  
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.  
 
Gender Equality Attitudes 
There are different views about the roles of women and men in society. How 
much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
1. Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in 
government.  
2. Men and women should have the same rights in every way. 
3. Women should stay out of politics.  
4. When there are not many jobs available, men should more right to a job 
than women.  
5. Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs.  
6. Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women.  
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree.  
 
Tolerance towards Immigrants 
People are increasingly moving from one country to another. How much do you 
agree or disagree with the following statements about immigrants? 
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1. Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue speaking their own 
language.  
2. Immigrant children should have the same opportunities for education that 
other children in the country have. 
3. Immigrants who live in a country for several years should have the 
opportunity to vote in elections. 
4. Immigrants should have the opportunity to continue their own customs 
and lifestyle. 
5. Immigrants should have all the same rights that everyone else in the 
country has.  
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
 
Tolerance towards Ethnic and Racial Minorities 
There are different views on the rights and responsibilities of different ethnic/ 
racial groups in society. How much do you agree with the following statements? 
1. All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get a good 
education in <country of test>. 
2. All ethnic/ racial groups should have an equal chance to get good jobs in 
<country of test>. 
3. Schools should teach students to respect members of al ethnic/ racial 
groups. 
4. Members of all ethnic/ racial groups should be encouraged to run in 
elections for political office. 
5. Members of all ethnic/ racial groups should have the same rights and 
responsibilities.  
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
 
Trust Attitudes 
How much do you trust each of the following groups or institutions?  
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1. The national government. 
2. The local government.  
3. Courts of justice. 
4. The police. 
5. Political parties.  
6. National Parliament.  
Response categories: completely, quite a lot, a little, not at all.  
 
Attitudes towards One’s Country 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about <country 
of test>? 
1. The <flag of the country of test> is important to me. 
2. The political system in <country of test> works well. 
3. I have great respect for <country of test>. 
4. In <country of test> we should be proud of what we have achieved.  
5. I am proud to live in <country of test>. 
6. <Country of test> shows a lot of respect for the environment.  
7. Generally speaking, <country of test> is a better country to live in than 
most other counties.  
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
 
Interest in Political and Social Issues 
How much are you interested in the following issues?  
1. Political issues within your local community. 
2. Political issues in your country. 
3. Social issues in your country. 
4. Politics in other countries.  
5. International politics.  
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Response categories: very interested, quite interested, not very interested, not at 
all interested. 
Internal Political Efficacy 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about you and 
politics?  
1. I know more about politics than most people my age. 
2. When political issues or problems are being discusses, I usually have 
something to say. 
3. I am able to understand most political issues easily.  
4. I have political opinions worth listening to. 
5. As an adult I will be able to take part in politics. 
6. I have a good understanding of the political issues facing this country.  
Response categories: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. 
 
Support for Conventional Citizenship 
How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?  
1. Voting in every national election. 
2. Joining a political party. 
3. Learning about the country’s history. 
4. Following political issues in the newspaper, on the radio, on TV or on 
the internet. 
5. Showing respect for government representatives.  
6. Engaging in political discussions. 
Response categories: very important, quite important, not very important, not 
important at all.  
 
Support for Social-movement Related Citizenship 
How important are the following behaviors for being a good citizen?  
1. Participating in peaceful protests against laws believed to be unjust. 
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2. Participating in activities to benefit people in the local community. 
3. Taking part in activities promoting human rights. 
4. Taking part in activities to protect the environment.  
Response categories: very important, quite important, not very important, not 
important at all.  
 
Demographic Variables 
1. Are you a boy or a girl?  
2. About how many books are there in your home?  
Response categories: 0-10 books; 11-25 books, 26-100 books; 101-200 books; 
201-500 books; more than 500 books.  
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Appendix B: Correlation Coefficients 
 
Variable 1
. 
2
. 
3
. 
4
. 
5
. 
6
. 
7
. 
8
. 
9
. 
1
0. 
1. Support for democratic 
values 
1 .
12** 
.
27** 
.
10** 
.
17** 
.
30** 
.
36** 
.
31** 
-
.01 
.
07** 
2. Support for 
conventional citizen 
participation 
 1 .
47** 
.
43** 
.
34** 
.
01 
.
22** 
.
15** 
.
31* 
.
28** 
3. Support for social-
movement citizen 
participation  
  1 .
27** 
.
21** 
.
15** 
.
31** 
.
26** 
.
12** 
.
14** 
4. Interest in social and 
political issues 
   1 .
61** 
.
02** 
.
18** 
.
14** 
.
24** 
.
16** 
5. Internal political 
efficacy 
    1 .
02* 
.
16** 
.
10** 
.
15** 
.
13** 
6. Gender equality 
attitudes 
     1 .
40** 
.
31** 
.
08** 
-
.01 
7. Tolerance toward 
ethnic groups 
      1 .
55** 
.
17** 
.
12** 
8. Tolerance toward 
immigrants 
       1 .
11** 
.
03** 
9. Trust attitudes         1 .
44** 
10. Attitudes towards one’s 
country 
         1 
Note: *p<.05 ** p < .01 
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Appendix C: Summary of Discriminant Function Analysis 
 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Independent variable Function 
1 2 3 
Support for democratic values  -1.14 1.04 -.15 
Trust attitudes  -1.02 1.30 .51 
Tolerance toward immigrants -.023 -.12 -.52 
Gender equality attitudes 2.16 -.25 -.20 
Interest in social and political issues 1.32 -.65 -.76 
Internal political efficacy .42 .06 1.53 
Tolerance toward ethnic groups -.07 -.66 .42 
 
 
Function at Group Centroids  
Type of historical legacy Function 
1 2 3 
Established democracy  2.77 .58 .09 
Bureaucratic socialism   -3.70 .15 -2.30 
Accommodative socialism -.75 -2.03 .346 
Patrimonial socialism  -7.68 1.30 1.18 
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Appendix D: Bonus Finding 
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